* feat(nixpak): pass FIDO2 keys to Firefox, Chromium and Chrome Assisted-by: DeepSeek Harness (deepseek-flash) * feat(nixpak): support FIDO2 hotplug via udev-maintained node directory Replace launch-time hidraw discovery with host udev rules that hard-link FIDO-tagged hidraw nodes into /dev/fido-hidraw and remove them on unplug. The sandbox dev-binds that directory and gets static /dev/hidrawN symlinks into it, so keys plugged in after launch work and no stale node survives a reused hidraw minor. Narrow the extra mounts from whole /sys and /run/udev to /sys/class/hidraw, /run/udev/data and /run/udev/control; the policy suite now forbids the broad mounts and checks the wrapper and bind follow the fido2 option. Assisted-by: Claude Code (claude-opus-5-5) * refactor(nixpak): rewrite FIDO2 bwrap wrapper in Python The bash argument loop was hard to follow. Python inserts the /dev/hidrawN symlinks before "--" with a single list splice, and the header now explains the whole host-udev -> bind -> symlink chain step by step. Assisted-by: Claude Code (claude-opus-5-5) * docs(canokey): document phone-only management policy PCs only use the CanoKey; CanoKey Console management stays in the phone app and the Admin PIN is never typed on a PC. Record what the config enforces (sandboxed browsers get no raw USB/CCID, no vendor WebUSB udev rule) and what it does not (uaccess on the raw USB node, PC/SC access to the Admin applet, CTAP management from browsers). Assisted-by: Claude Code (claude-opus-5-5) * docs(canokey): separate management from use, link CanoKey docs Assisted-by: Claude Code (claude-opus-5-5) * fix(nixpak): create /dev/fido-hidraw from the udev rule NixOS applies /dev tmpfiles entries only at boot; switch-to-configuration runs systemd-tmpfiles-resetup with --exclude-prefix=/dev. After a switch without reboot the directory was missing and every `ln` failed with exit code 1, so no browser saw the key. The add rule now runs `mkdir -p` first. Also fix the documented trigger command: `udevadm trigger` defaults to `change`, which the add-only rule ignores. Assisted-by: Claude Code (claude-opus-5-5) * refactor(nixpak): keep tmpfiles as the only creator of /dev/fido-hidraw The /dev tmpfiles units run before systemd-udevd on every boot, so the directory always exists before coldplug. The mkdir in the udev rule only covered the first switch without reboot and duplicated the tmpfiles rule; drop it and document the one-time `systemd-tmpfiles --prefix` command. Assisted-by: Claude Code (claude-opus-5-5) * docs(nixpak): record FIDO2 hardware validation in Firefox and Chrome After a reboot on ai with the CanoKey present at boot, udev linked only the FIDO interface and WebAuthn works in Firefox and Chrome. Chromium and plugging the key in after launch remain pending. Assisted-by: Claude Code (claude-opus-5-5)
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Linux Hardening
Deployed and interactively validated on the Linux desktop host (2026-10-31). Policy and limits: SECURITY.md.
Why these apps are sandboxed
The packaging scope is driven by blast radius and input exposure, not by treating the applications as malicious. These apps parse complex local or remote content, load third-party plugins (OBS), or hold powerful network/session privileges (Remmina); a parser, plugin or session compromise would otherwise inherit the user's home, session D-Bus, devices and network. Each wrapper grants only the ports, devices, sockets, writable directories and desktop portals needed by that app's documented workflow.
Shared boundaries
- Cleared environment; filtered session D-Bus; private
/dev/shm; per-app/tmp. Chromium-family browsers share an app-specific/tmpso external URLs reuse one browser instance. - Read-only
/nix/store; GPU and display; fonts and themes; LAN and Internet. - Portals for file chooser, URI opening, notifications, input methods and document exports.
- No whole host home, system D-Bus, SSH agent, raw USB/serial or raw camera. For
Firefox/Chromium/Chrome, the only device passthrough is the FIDO HID interface of a security key:
host udev rules hard-link FIDO-tagged hidraw nodes into
/dev/fido-hidraw, which the sandbox binds together with read-only/sys/class/hidrawand the udev database, so keys can be plugged in after launch. Other HID interfaces, CCID and raw USB stay hidden. Raw PipeWire is granted only to MuseScore for its ALSA-via-PipeWire audio path; see Limits. - Host loopback only for Firefox/Chromium; all other apps use pasta-isolated loopback. Chromium is an intentional development exception. Brave Origin and Edge are backup browsers and receive no media grants.
App permissions
Media means audio playback, microphone, Camera and ScreenCast portals. Writable paths are listed
explicitly; other files use the document portal. Every app also has private writable state.
| App | Network | Writable paths | Grants |
|---|---|---|---|
| Firefox | Host loopback | ~/.mozilla, personal files, Trash, Firefox artwork |
Audio, browserpass, MPRIS, idle, FIDO2 key; camera/screen sharing intentionally unavailable |
| Chromium | Host loopback | ~/.config/chromium, personal files |
Media, browserpass, MPRIS, idle, FIDO2 key, v12 Secret |
| Chrome | Isolated | ~/.config/google-chrome, Downloads |
Media, browserpass, MPRIS, idle, FIDO2 key, v12 Secret |
| Brave Origin | Isolated | ~/.config/BraveSoftware/Brave-Origin, Downloads |
v12 Secret |
| Edge | Isolated | ~/.config/microsoft-edge, Downloads |
v12 Secret |
| Isolated | Personal files, private app state | Media, notifications, tray, MPRIS, idle, accessibility | |
| Telegram | Isolated | Personal files, private app state | Media, notifications, tray, MPRIS, idle, accessibility, Ayatana indicators |
| Zoom | Isolated | ~/.zoom, zoomus.conf, zoom.conf, Downloads, Documents/Zoom, private app state |
Media, X11/XWayland, FHS, SNI tray, idle, /dev/video0-1, read-only /sys/class/drm |
| Isolated | Documents, Downloads, app-scoped wechat data, private app state |
Media, Wayland, X11 fallback, SNI tray, file chooser portal | |
| Foliate | None | Documents/Downloads/Pictures read-only, app-scoped state | File chooser, OpenURI, notifications, IME, accessibility |
| Krita | None | Documents/Downloads/Pictures writable, app-scoped state | File chooser, OpenURI, print, inhibit, notifications, IME, accessibility |
| Bambu Studio | Isolated | Documents/Downloads/Pictures writable, app-scoped state | X11/XWayland, PulseAudio, cloud/LAN network, file chooser, notifications, IME, accessibility |
| OrcaSlicer | Isolated | Documents/Downloads/Pictures writable, app-scoped state | X11/XWayland, cloud/LAN network, file chooser, notifications, IME, accessibility |
| Remmina | Isolated | ~/.config/remmina, ~/.local/share/remmina, ~/.remmina, Downloads |
PulseAudio, SSH agent, file chooser, OpenURI, notifications, IME, accessibility |
| OBS Studio | Isolated | ~/.config/obs-studio, Videos/Pictures/Downloads |
ScreenCast, V4L2 camera (/dev/video0-1), PulseAudio, tray, notifications, IME, accessibility |
| Blender | Isolated | ~/.config/blender, Documents/Downloads/Pictures/Videos |
X11/XWayland, PulseAudio, notifications, IME, accessibility |
| MuseScore | Isolated | ~/.config/MuseScore, ~/.local/share/MuseScore, Documents/Downloads/Music/Pictures |
ALSA via PipeWire, ALSA sequencer, X11/XWayland, print, notifications, IME, accessibility |
| mpv | Isolated | ~/.config/mpv, ~/.cache/mpv, ~/.local/state/mpv; media dirs read-only |
MPRIS, file chooser, OpenURI |
| imv | None | $HOME read-only |
File chooser, OpenURI |
All browsers get read-only NSS certificates, printing, native notifications and accessibility.
Browser secrets
- Chromium family: app-scoped Secret portal only.
SecretPortalKeyProviderUseForEncryptionwrites v12 cookies; noorg.freedesktop.secretsor broad keyring access. - If the Secret portal is unavailable, Chromium can fall back to v10. Monitor
Local State.os_crypt.portal.prev_init_success. - Firefox uses NSS:
key4.dbandlogins.jsonfor logins,cookies.sqlitefor cookies. It has no Secret portal or keyring grant. A Primary Password protects saved logins, not cookies. - browserpass is separate: it exposes the password store and GPG-agent socket, not cookie encryption.
- Bookmarks, history, localStorage, IndexedDB and extension data remain readable by the browser. nixpak isolates them from other apps, not from browser compromise.
Limits
- X11: Zoom and WeChat have shared-display trust; portal permissions cannot enforce portal-only capture.
- PulseAudio grants recording authority. Read-only GPG sockets still permit signing and decryption.
- pasta isolates loopback, not LAN access. Chromecast discovery is unverified.
- Brave Origin and Edge intentionally have no PulseAudio, Camera, ScreenCast or MPRIS grants. They are backup browsers, not media browsers. They also receive no FIDO2 passthrough.
- FIDO2 passthrough is limited to the hidraw interface whose report descriptor declares the FIDO usage page. On the CanoKey that is the FIDO interface only: its KBD and CCID interfaces, other HID devices and raw USB stay outside the sandbox. A compromised browser process can send raw CTAP to the key; the key's PIN and touch policy remain the authentication boundary. The read-only udev database exposes properties of all host devices, much of which is already readable via the sysfs device binds.
- CanoKey management (CanoKey Console over WebUSB) is intentionally unavailable: Firefox has no WebUSB and the sandbox exposes no raw USB. PCs only use the key; management happens in the phone app. See canokey.nix for the policy and its limits.
- FIDO2 hotplug relies on udev events, which only reach the host network namespace. Firefox and
Chromium therefore detect keys plugged in after launch; pasta-isolated Chrome needs the key
present before launch.
/dev/fido-hidrawis created at boot. When first deploying withswitchinstead of a reboot, runsudo systemd-tmpfiles --create --prefix=/dev/fido-hidraw, then replug the key (orsudo udevadm trigger --action=add -s hidraw) and fully restart the browsers: a browser started while the directory was missing has no bind for it. - Firefox camera and remote screen sharing are intentionally disabled. Firefox does not support the
XDG Camera/ScreenCast portal path used here, so granting camera or screen-capture access would
require widening the sandbox with raw
/dev/video*or direct PipeWire access. We choose not to grant that privilege. - Bambu Studio's nixpkgs build omits the
device_pagefrontend bundle, so filament management is unavailable. Its MakerWorld sidebar entry also requires the upstreamfirstguide.finish = "true"workaround; the startup splash may render black under XWayland. - Remmina's SSH Tunnel support receives a read-only SSH agent socket and SSH client config. A compromised Remmina can use the agent to sign or decrypt while the agent is running.
- OBS, Blender, MuseScore and mpv use pasta-isolated networking. Host loopback services are not reachable unless the app is changed to a host-loopback exception.
- MuseScore receives the raw PipeWire socket so its ALSA driver can use the host
pcm.!defaultPipeWire plugin. PipeWire is a general media graph, so this is broader than a single audio stream: a compromised MuseScore could enumerate other user-visible PipeWire media nodes. The alternative, direct/dev/snd, confines the media graph but bypasses PipeWire device selection, per-app volume and mixing. - OBS on Linux defaults its recording path to
$HOME. The sandbox intentionally binds only the declared home subdirectories, so recording output must targetVideos,PicturesorDownloads; a file written to the home root exists only in the sandbox's transient mount namespace.
Validation
- Passed:
just fmt,just test,ai-niribuild,shoukei-nirieval and all wrapper builds. - Interactive validation passed for Firefox, Chrome, Chromium, Brave Origin, Edge, QQ, Telegram, Zoom, Bambu Studio and OrcaSlicer. Chromium's host-loopback/personal-file exception and the Brave/Edge no-media policy are intentional.
- OBS Studio passed interactive validation for PipeWire screen capture, V4L2 camera capture, desktop/microphone audio, local NVENC H.264 MP4 recording and local RTMP streaming. External provider authentication and browser sources remain unvalidated.
- Remmina, Blender, mpv and imv build and pass the policy suite; interactive validation is still pending. MuseScore passed launch, XWayland and ALSA-to-PipeWire routing checks; audible playback and user workflows still need confirmation.
- Chromium smoke test passed: renderer sandbox, environment clearing, bind scope, disposable-profile persistence and loopback policy.
- FIDO2 browser passthrough is enabled for Firefox/Chromium/Chrome only. WebAuthn with the CanoKey passed in Firefox and Chrome; Chromium and plugging the key in after launch still need validation.
- WeChat uses the native nixpkgs-master package with nixpak as the only bwrap layer. Build/policy pass; interactive Wayland validation is still pending.
- Evidence and repeat commands: runtime validation, policy test, which auto-loads every suite under tests/policy.
Code map
- nixpaks/: wrappers and Home Manager package overlay.
- desktop-base.nix: shared runtime and XDG storage.
- portal-groups.nix, desktop-integration.nix: portal and desktop service grants.
- browser-permissions.nix, fido-bwrap.nix, chromium-browser.nix: browser scopes, FIDO2 passthrough wrapper and launcher.
- nixpaks/wechat.nix: WeChat package and data setup.
- kernel-hardening.nix, apparmor/: kernel sysctl and AppArmor profiles.