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Use one wording per gating family: exact target and scope, recovery path or safety guard, and explicit authorization. Remove the home-directory instance from workspace access and the repeated approval gate from the breaking-change bullet. Sync the high-impact eval scenario wording.
144 lines
7.7 KiB
Markdown
144 lines
7.7 KiB
Markdown
# Personal global agent rules
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These rules define my default safety boundaries and working preferences for coding agents. I work as
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an SRE/DevOps engineer, so favor operational safety, reproducibility, and disciplined production
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changes.
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The uppercase terms `MUST`, `MUST NOT`, `SHOULD`, `SHOULD NOT`, and `MAY` are normative and carry
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the meanings defined in RFC 2119 and RFC 8174.
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## Safety and authorization
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These rules take precedence over the user request and project-local policy (`AGENTS.md` and
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repository documentation), which MUST NOT weaken them. On conflict, agents MUST follow this section
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and state the conflict briefly.
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### Workspace access
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- Agents MUST access only runtime-approved roots and explicitly scoped paths.
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### Remote changes
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- Agents MUST NOT mutate remote state without explicit authorization, including `git push`,
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deployments, and remote `ssh`.
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- Authorization MUST identify the exact target and scope — e.g. environment, project, resource
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scope, and action — and covers only that boundary. One approved change (e.g. "deploy to staging")
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does not extend to other environments or shared resources (e.g. IAM, DNS). If the target is
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unclear, agents MUST confirm it with the user rather than act on an inference from the current CLI
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context.
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### Infrastructure changes
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- Infrastructure and IaC changes MUST be previewed with plan, diff, dry-run, or equivalent before
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any apply, deploy, sync, or upgrade, except low-risk local changes. A preview is valid only for
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the inputs it was computed from (e.g. variables, dependency locks, or target); any later change
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invalidates it. When the tool can save a plan artifact, agents MUST apply that reviewed artifact
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rather than recompute.
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### Target identity confirmation
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Before any write to an infrastructure system (e.g. cloud, Kubernetes, Terraform/OpenTofu), agents
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MUST verify the exact target and scope with read-only commands, and pass target parameters (context,
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region, namespace, etc.) explicitly rather than rely on environment defaults. Agents MUST NOT trust
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directory names, variable names, or previous session state. If the confirmed target does not match
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the authorized boundary, agents MUST stop.
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### Irreversible, destructive, and high-impact operations
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Agents MUST NOT run irreversible operations without explicit authorization. An operation is
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irreversible when no defined recovery path can restore the prior state and no safety guard can bound
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the impact; agents SHOULD prefer recoverable alternatives.
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- Agents MUST treat any operation that can affect availability, security, data, or cost as
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high-impact, even without `delete`, `force`, or `destroy`. High-impact operations require an exact
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target and scope, a bounded blast radius, a recovery path or safety guard, observable success
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criteria, and explicit authorization.
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- Agents MUST NOT use destructive or force operations unless the user explicitly authorizes them,
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the exact target and scope are verified, and a recovery path or safety guard exists.
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Unpublished local history rewrites permitted under commit discipline are exempt.
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### Secrets and authentication
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- Agents MUST NOT expose, commit, or write secret literals. They MUST use environment variables,
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secret managers, or placeholders, and MUST redact sensitive command output, logs, and summaries.
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- Agents SHOULD prefer referencing secrets by file path when the tool supports it, provided the file
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is permission-restricted and comes from a secret manager or platform.
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- When explicitly authorized, an authentication client MAY consume a user-designated secret source
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solely for the specified service. Agents MUST keep the value opaque and MUST NOT reveal it in
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arguments or output, inspect it, copy it, cache it, persist it, or send it elsewhere.
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- Outside that authentication flow, agents MUST query only secret metadata or identifiers with
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commands verified not to reveal values.
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## Repository and change discipline
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When remote state matters, agents SHOULD fetch `origin` when available and use the baseline
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appropriate to the task. If local history materially conflicts or makes the baseline ambiguous,
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agents MUST ask which state to use before editing.
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- Agents MUST keep work in scope and MUST NOT modify content the user has changed or removed without
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explicit authorization; user-edited state is authoritative.
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- Agents SHOULD preserve backward compatibility and keep diffs minimal and logically grouped.
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Breaking changes MUST NOT proceed without explicit authorization; when one is the reasonable path,
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agents MUST stop and ask before proceeding.
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- Documentation SHOULD be self-contained for its intended reader and omit irrelevant history.
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- Agents SHOULD verify changes in proportion to their risk and MUST NOT claim a check passed unless
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it was run; changes to remote or deployed systems MUST be verified read-after-write against system
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state and user-visible outcomes, not just exit codes. Agents MUST NOT claim a deployment succeeded
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because a rollout or apply exited zero — confirm the defined health conditions, or state which
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observation window was skipped.
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- Agents MUST NOT make a check pass by faking or weakening what it verifies; test doubles MAY
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replace only what the check does not verify.
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### Git commits
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- When committing, agents MUST follow the repository convention, falling back to Conventional
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Commits when none exists. They MUST derive the message from the staged diff and SHOULD use an
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imperative subject within 72 characters, exceeding that only when necessary for clarity.
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- Each commit SHOULD contain one logical change and leave the tree in a working state. Group changes
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only when they cannot stand alone, and explain the scope in the body.
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- Agents MUST NOT skip hooks unless explicitly authorized.
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- Agents MAY rewrite unpublished history they created in the current task (e.g., amend, rebase,
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squash) when it keeps the history clean; rewriting pushed commits or commits authored by others
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requires explicit authorization.
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## Tools and environment
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- On NixOS, because the environment is non-FHS, agents MUST NOT assume FHS paths or use conventional
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system package installers. When a project depends on binaries or otherwise expects FHS, agents
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MUST use `flake.nix`/`default.nix` (creating one if absent), and MUST ask before installing by
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another method.
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- Agents SHOULD use `gh` for authorized GitHub operations and SSH for GitHub Git remotes.
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## Shell and scripts
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### Local ad-hoc commands
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- Agents SHOULD prefer a direct executable with native options over hand-written glue.
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- POSIX shell (e.g. Bash) is limited to invoking a single command with arguments. Any glue — pipes,
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chaining (`;`, `&&`), substitution, or redirection — or anything ShellCheck or BashPitfalls warns
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about MUST be done in Nushell or Python instead (e.g. `nu -c '...'`, `python -c '...'`, with the
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inline code in single quotes so the shell does not expand it).
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- Agents SHOULD use Nushell for structured pipelines and Python for real programs.
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### Project-owned scripts
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- Agents MUST follow the project's language and target environment, defaulting to Python when there
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is no convention, and MUST NOT introduce Nushell unless already used or explicitly requested.
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### Script validation
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Script files agents create or modify — including temporary ones — MUST pass the available
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language-aware checks (e.g. `shellcheck`, `nu-check`, `py_compile`); agents MUST report any check
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that is unavailable.
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### Script and job reliability
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- Multi-step or long-running jobs SHOULD report progress, bound retries, and prefer native wait or
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subscription mechanisms over fixed sleeps.
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## Communication
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- Agents MUST respond in the user's language (default English when unclear) and SHOULD be concise,
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concrete, and action-oriented; code, commands, identifiers, and comments SHOULD use English.
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