Deploy RustFS in place of the retired MinIO and move the S3 consumers over.
- flake.nix / flake.lock / outputs/default.nix: add a nixpkgs-small
(nixos-unstable-small) input for the rustfs 1.0.0 package (with the web
console), instantiated as pkgs-small in genSpecialArgs alongside the other
nixpkgs instances; drop the rustfs flake input. The rest of the system stays
on the default nixpkgs.
- hosts/12kingdoms-youko/homelab-services/rustfs.nix: use nixpkgs' own
services.rustfs module, with package = pkgs-small.rustfs and
environmentFile = the agenix rustfs.env secret.
- caddy.nix: s3.writefor.fun (S3 API) and s3-console.writefor.fun (console,
redirects / to /rustfs/console/).
- secrets/nixos.nix: declare a single rustfs.env (dotenv) secret holding
RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY / RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY, replacing the separate key files.
- infra/minio -> infra/rustfs: buckets are managed with the hashicorp/aws
provider against the RustFS S3 endpoint; IAM/ILM are applied with rc.
Crush hardcodes banned bash commands, blocking many operations. Drop the package, its AGENTS.md/CRUSH.md install target, env vars, and preservation entries.
Keep the six node configuration intact while removing the failing user activation from the three control-plane MicroVMs. Update the regression test and current K3s configuration notes.
0.156.1 still lacks the codex-chatgpt recursion_limit attribute, so keep the postPatch that adds it. The vendored Cargo.lock is unchanged, so the cargoHash stays the same.
cilium writes /etc/cni/net.d while istio-cni reads k3s's own dir, so on the new workers the chained plugin never found a network config. Add the symlinks the server module already has.
kubelet refuses to self-assign the reserved node-role.kubernetes.io/* labels, so the worker --node-label made the agent crash-loop. Drop it and rely on the masters' control-plane taint for placement; document that the taint only lands via registerWithTaints on first registration, so it was applied by hand here.
- run two autocutsel instances so the X PRIMARY/CLIPBOARD selections stay in
sync, making copy/paste work in the session and through VNC
- drop --disable-blink-features=AutomationControlled: nothing drives the
browser over CDP, so navigator.webdriver is already false and the flag only
marked the setup as automated
- document why the driver stays on real X11/AT-SPI input and is never granted
a CDP attach, and note the SSH-tunnel path for manual VNC access
- extend the computer-use eval test
Add worker-1 (4 vCPU / 16 GiB) on shoryu, and worker-2 (4 vCPU / 16 GiB) plus worker-3 (2 vCPU / 8 GiB) on shushou, as microVMs. They come with a genK3sAgentModule and the per-host/output/home-manager wiring, and are labelled node-role.kubernetes.io/worker=true. The masters keep their control-plane:NoSchedule taint, so workloads land on the workers.
The script pointed the macOS nix-daemon at the homelab v2ray HTTP proxy (192.168.5.101:7890), but that proxy was never running. Remove it together with the just darwin-set-proxy recipe and the README step that referenced it.
Reserve 192.168.5.192/27 as a dedicated kube-vip block, outside the router's DHCP pool (.2-.99): one /29 per cluster, k3s-test-1 gets .192/29 with the API VIP at .193.
Advertise only youko itself (.183/32) and that block over Tailscale, instead of the whole /24. The /24 route shadowed hosts that are already reachable directly, e.g. idols-ai at 192.168.5.100.
Deploy prerequisites (not in this repo): approve the new Tailscale routes; point kube-vip at the new VIP; move the *.writefor.fun wildcard from .101 to .183 and update scripts/darwin_set_proxy.py, since .101 is no longer advertised.
Give the idols-ruby and idols-kana VMs a headless computer-use
environment: Xvfb plus i3, driven by cua-driver (and computer-use-linux
as a fallback). Includes the system module (AT-SPI, fonts, Mesa, Clash
Verge proxy, proxy-region timezone), the home i3 module (Xvfb/i3/x11vnc
services, browser flags), host wiring and an eval test.
Package the prebuilt releases (computer-use-linux v0.7.1 and
cua-driver-rs v0.24.0) under pkgs/, injected through thin callPackage
overlays so they are easy to relocate to the NUR repository later.
Only three secrets are readable as the login user (nix-access-tokens,
ssh-key-romantic and the nushell one); everything else is root-only and
the filesystem already keeps agents out.
* feat(backup): notify on failure, and 404 unconfigured hostnames
A failed backup was silent. Post to alertmanager (which routes above-info
to telegram), and have caddy answer 404 instead of its empty 200 for
*.writefor.fun names that are not services.
* docs(backup): say 'cloud copy' rather than 'offsite'
Clearer for a reader who does not live in backup jargon; the requirement
(not in the homelab, immutable) is spelled out in the text.
* docs(secrets): state the recipient invariant
A recipient set must answer two questions: who may read it, and how it is
recovered once those hosts are gone. Dropping recovery_key while narrowing
a secret is easy and silent.
* docs(secrets): state that every secret must be decryptable by the desktops
The desktops hold the trusted admin keys and are where secrets are edited and
rekeyed from; narrowing a set to the servers alone breaks agenix -r and drops
the offline recovery key.
* docs(secrets): desktops and recovery_key have identical access
recovery_key is a member of desktop_keys, so every group written as
desktop_keys ++ ... covers both.
* feat(monitoring): scrape the restic rest-server
Expose /metrics on the loopback-bound server, scrape it with
victoriametrics, and block /metrics on the public vhost.
* docs(backup): record what the metrics actually expose
rest-server only ships the go/promhttp defaults, so repository growth is
charted from node-exporter's filesystem metrics instead.
The desktops hold the trusted admin keys and are where secrets are edited and
rekeyed from; narrowing a set to the servers alone breaks agenix -r and drops
the offline recovery key.
A recipient set must answer two questions: who may read it, and how it is
recovered once those hosts are gone. Dropping recovery_key while narrowing
a secret is easy and silent.
A failed backup was silent. Post to alertmanager (which routes above-info
to telegram), and have caddy answer 404 instead of its empty 200 for
*.writefor.fun names that are not services.
A desktop holds both the plaintext and the repository password, so blocking
deletion on the server protects little while preventing the automatic
retention the client needs. Immutability belongs in the offsite copy.
The design (layers, password groups, retention, restore steps) was only in
code comments. Also make the timer configurable: a whole hour of random
delay defeated any staggering, and the desktop's push, youko's own run and
btrbk all otherwise contend for the same disks.
Split the repository password into desktop and homelab groups, add the
environmentFile/pruneOpts module options, and point the desktop at youko's
REST endpoint.
Allowlist of the irreplaceable directories (Documents, work, Pictures,
nix-config, .local/state); project checkouts under ~/codes live in git and
are not backed up. Kept the excludes generic, since this repo is public.
Also move the restic-password secret to a desktop.enable || server.storage
gate so desktops get it without enabling a server group.
* feat(hosts): per-host restic backups to the SMB remote
Replace the disabled aggregate job (which rsynced every host's /persistent
into /tmp - a tmpfs - and silently produced incomplete backups) with one
restic repo per host, backing up its own data directly:
- shared module lib/genResticBackup.nix: secrets, rclone/SMB target
(rclone:smb-downloads:/Downloads/homelab-backup/<host>), retention, and
excludes for the regenerable/bulky paths (podman overlay layers, microvm
and libvirt disk images, nfs golden images, logs, caches)
- youko additionally backs up the service state under /persistent/var/lib
and dumps all postgres databases first (a consistent SQL artifact beside
the crash-consistent data dir)
- shoryu/shushou back up /etc/agenix, /etc/ssh and the k3s token
Needs three agenix secrets before it can run: restic-password,
ssh-key-for-restic-backup and rclone-conf-for-restic-backup.
* refactor(hosts): only restic does off-host; btrbk stays local
btrbk works at the subvolume level, so a would ship the whole
@persistent - including podman's overlay storage, the microVM/libvirt
images and the nfs golden images - which is exactly the regenerable bulk
we want out of the backups.
So: btrbk keeps making the cheap local CoW snapshots (quick rollbacks),
and restic owns the off-host copies with file-level excludes. Back up the
whole /persistent minus those excludes, so nothing is missed.
Update the btrbk module's comment to say so.
* fix(restic): never back up keys; drop the implicit /etc/agenix
restic's own password lives in /etc/agenix, so backing that up would store
the repository's password inside the repository. Exclude agenix, the ssh
host keys and the usual credential dirs (.ssh, .gnupg, .aws, gcloud).
* refactor(restic): make the backup a proper module
Replace lib/genResticBackup.nix with modules/nixos/base/restic-backup.nix,
which declares modules.restic-backup options (enable, repository, paths,
exclude, requiresMountsFor, postgresDump) like the btrbk module does.
youko just sets the options now.
* refactor(restic): exclude the whole podman storage, trim retention
Exclude /persistent/var/lib/containers wholesale: the image layers are
re-pullable and podman's storage DB is not consistent when copied from a
running podman. uptime-kuma's named volume lives there, but its data is
not wanted anyway.
Retention: daily 3, weekly 2, monthly 2 - no yearly.
* refactor(restic): back up a short-lived btrfs snapshot, drop pg_dump
A live copy of a running postgres data dir is only crash-consistent. Instead
of a daily pg_dumpall (which duplicates the data in the repository and gets
slower as the DB grows), take a short-lived read-only btrfs snapshot in
backupPrepareCommand, back that up, and delete it right after - a
consistency step, not a second backup. The excludes are relative now so they
work for both the snapshot and a direct path.
* feat(secrets): restic-password for modules.restic-backup
With the rekeyed secret in nix-secrets (storage group, alongside
hdd-luks-crypt-key), the module's passwordFile resolves.
* fix(restic): agenix's secret is under /run/agenix, not /etc/agenix
* fix(restic): take the password path from agenix, not a hardcoded one
config.age.secrets."restic-password".path follows agenix's secretsDir, so it
stays correct if that changes.
* refactor(youko): let preservation own the service state dirs
The services' data now sits on the SSD, so the hand-written dataDir +
systemd.tmpfiles rules are unnecessary: /var/lib is already preserved by
preservation, and the upstream modules create and own their default
state dirs (StateDirectory). Use the defaults:
- gitea /var/lib/gitea, grafana, sftpgo, caddy, victoriametrics,
postgresql (/var/lib/postgresql/<version>), uptime-kuma, homepage
- drop the per-service tmpfiles rules and victoriametrics' self-bind
Data was moved in place with mv (same filesystem): /persistent/apps/<svc>
(== /var/lib/<svc> via the preservation bind) so nothing was copied.
* refactor(youko): drop caddy's redundant tmpfiles rules
The activation script already creates the fileserver tree with mkdir -p and
the module creates caddy's dataDir, so the rules - and the unused vms
directory they created - are redundant.
* refactor(youko): use a podman named volume for uptime-kuma
podman creates the volume and takes the ownership from the image, so the
kuma user, the tmpfiles rule and the host directory are no longer needed;
the volume lives under /var/lib/containers, which preservation keeps.
The services now run directly on the host, so their state does not belong
on the HDD behind the flaky USB-SATA bridge: /data/apps was small-file
heavy and latency/consistency sensitive. Point every dataDir at
/persistent/apps (the LUKS nvme) instead.
The HDD keeps the bulk data that suits it: /data/fileshare (173G) and
/data/backups (24G). The HDD's old @apps subvolume and its data are left
in place for now.