feat(k3s): disable kube-proxy for Cilium eBPF replacement (#404)

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ryan4yin | 二花 authored and GitHub committed 2026-10-07 17:58:33 +08:00
1 parent 2af97e37b9
commit df6f9b8d6d
2 files changed
+10 -39

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+5 -22
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@@ -12,26 +12,13 @@ in
{
environment.systemPackages = [ package ];
# Kernel modules required by cilium
boot.kernelModules = [
"ip6_tables"
"ip6table_mangle"
"ip6table_raw"
"ip6table_filter"
];
networking.enableIPv6 = true;
networking.nat = {
enable = true;
enableIPv6 = true;
boot.kernel.sysctl = {
"net.ipv4.ip_forward" = 1;
"net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding" = 1;
};
# Pods may reach the host services they need, but they are not part of the
# host's trusted LAN. Deny the credential-bearing host ports before the broad
# pod-network accept below, so a compromised pod cannot reach NFS, the
# database, the backup server, the VNC consoles, or an exporter. `mkAfter`
# keeps this after the shared base rules (incl. the node_exporter drop).
# Ports 80/443 stay reachable so in-cluster calls through the ingress are not
# broken; the ingress is the authentication boundary there.
# Deny pods the credential-bearing host ports before the pod accept below.
networking.firewall.extraInputRules = pkgs.lib.mkAfter ''
ip saddr 10.0.0.0/8 tcp dport { 22, 2049, 2283, 5432, 5900, 5901, 5902, 5903, 8000, 8081, 8082, 9090, 9093, 9100, 9633, 9835 } drop
ip6 saddr fd00::/104 tcp dport { 22, 2049, 2283, 5432, 5900, 5901, 5902, 5903, 8000, 8081, 8082, 9090, 9093, 9100, 9633, 9835 } drop
@@ -57,11 +44,7 @@ in
pkgs.lib.concatStringsSep " " flagList;
};
# Link k3s's CNI directories to the conventional locations, so CNI plugins
# that write to /etc/cni/net.d or /opt/cni/bin (cilium, istio-cni) share them
# with k3s. Without this, cilium writes /etc/cni/net.d while istio-cni reads
# k3s's own dir, and the chained plugin never finds a network config.
# Mirrors the server module.
# Share k3s's CNI dirs with plugins using the conventional paths (cilium, istio-cni).
systemd.tmpfiles.rules = [
"L+ /opt/cni/bin - - - - /var/lib/rancher/k3s/data/cni/"
"d /var/lib/rancher/k3s/agent/etc/cni/net.d 0751 root root - -"
+5 -17
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@@ -39,26 +39,13 @@ in
dive # explore docker layers
];
# Kernel modules required by cilium
boot.kernelModules = [
"ip6_tables"
"ip6table_mangle"
"ip6table_raw"
"ip6table_filter"
];
networking.enableIPv6 = true;
networking.nat = {
enable = true;
enableIPv6 = true;
boot.kernel.sysctl = {
"net.ipv4.ip_forward" = 1;
"net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding" = 1;
};
# Pods may reach the host services they need, but they are not part of the
# host's trusted LAN. Deny the credential-bearing host ports before the broad
# pod-network accept below, so a compromised pod cannot reach NFS, the
# database, the backup server, the VNC consoles, or an exporter. `mkAfter`
# keeps this after the shared base rules (incl. the node_exporter drop).
# Ports 80/443 stay reachable so in-cluster calls through the ingress are not
# broken; the ingress is the authentication boundary there.
# Deny pods the credential-bearing host ports before the pod accept below.
networking.firewall.extraInputRules = lib.mkAfter ''
ip saddr 10.0.0.0/8 tcp dport { 22, 2049, 2283, 5432, 5900, 5901, 5902, 5903, 8000, 8081, 8082, 9090, 9093, 9100, 9633, 9835 } drop
ip6 saddr fd00::/104 tcp dport { 22, 2049, 2283, 5432, 5900, 5901, 5902, 5903, 8000, 8081, 8082, 9090, 9093, 9100, 9633, 9835 } drop
@@ -90,6 +77,7 @@ in
"--disable=traefik" # deploy our own ingress controller instead
"--disable=servicelb" # we use kube-vip instead
"--disable-network-policy" # Cilium enforces network policies instead
"--disable-kube-proxy" # Cilium's eBPF replacement handles services
"--tls-san=${masterHost}"
]
++ (map (label: "--node-label=${label}") nodeLabels)