Serve the web client from yaak-web (#582)

This commit is contained in:
Gregory Schier
2026-08-18 10:39:17 -07:00
committed by GitHub
parent 3f202ff664
commit 538f782068
50 changed files with 809 additions and 424 deletions
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use clap::Parser;
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use std::path::PathBuf;
/// The server behind Yaak running in a browser.
///
/// The tab renders the request and owns the data; this binary puts the bytes on the network
/// and streams back what came back, and with `--serve` hands the browser the app as well.
/// Nothing is written to disk or a database.
#[derive(Parser, Debug, Clone)]
#[command(name = "yaak-web", version, about, long_about = None)]
pub struct Config {
/// Address to listen on. 127.0.0.1 for a local instance; 0.0.0.0 inside a container.
#[arg(long, env = "YAAK_WEB_BIND", default_value = "127.0.0.1:9227")]
pub bind: SocketAddr,
/// Also serve a built web client from this directory, on the same origin as the API.
/// Unknown paths fall back to `index.html` so the app's own routes work on a refresh.
/// Without this the binary is only the send executor.
#[arg(long, env = "YAAK_WEB_SERVE", value_name = "DIR")]
pub serve: Option<PathBuf>,
/// Allow sends to loopback, private and link-local addresses. Off by default, because a
/// server reachable by strangers is an open relay into the network it sits on. Turn it on
/// only for an instance whose users are meant to reach that network — a self-hosted one
/// on a LAN, where the point is to call the API on the next machine.
#[arg(long, env = "YAAK_WEB_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORKS", default_value_t = false)]
pub allow_private_networks: bool,
/// Browser origins allowed to call this server (CORS), comma-separated. `*` allows any.
/// A local dev instance wants the Vite origin; a hosted instance wants its own web origin.
#[arg(
long,
env = "YAAK_WEB_ALLOWED_ORIGINS",
default_value = "*",
value_delimiter = ','
)]
pub allowed_origins: Vec<String>,
/// Largest request the server accepts from the tab (the rendered request JSON, body included).
#[arg(long, env = "YAAK_WEB_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES", default_value_t = 16 * 1024 * 1024)]
pub max_request_bytes: usize,
/// Largest upstream response body the server will relay before cutting the send off.
#[arg(long, env = "YAAK_WEB_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES", default_value_t = 64 * 1024 * 1024)]
pub max_response_bytes: usize,
/// Ceiling on a send's timeout, in seconds. A request asking for longer (or for no timeout)
/// gets this instead.
#[arg(long, env = "YAAK_WEB_MAX_TIMEOUT_SECS", default_value_t = 60)]
pub max_timeout_secs: u64,
/// Sends allowed per client IP per minute. 0 disables the limit. This and the concurrency
/// cap are the whole of what protects an instance: there is no authentication.
#[arg(long, env = "YAAK_WEB_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE", default_value_t = 120)]
pub rate_limit_per_minute: u32,
/// Sends in flight at once across all clients.
#[arg(long, env = "YAAK_WEB_MAX_CONCURRENT", default_value_t = 256)]
pub max_concurrent: usize,
/// Take the client IP from `X-Forwarded-For` (first hop) instead of the socket. Only turn
/// this on behind a load balancer that sets the header; otherwise anyone can spoof their way
/// past the rate limit.
#[arg(long, env = "YAAK_WEB_TRUST_FORWARDED_FOR", default_value_t = false)]
pub trust_forwarded_for: bool,
}
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//! Where a send may go.
//!
//! A hosted sender is, by construction, a machine that makes HTTP requests on
//! behalf of strangers. Left alone that is an open relay into whatever network
//! it sits on: cloud metadata endpoints, internal admin panels, the database
//! next door. So every destination is checked twice — once on the URL before a
//! hop is attempted (literal IPs, host allow/deny lists) and once on the
//! addresses a hostname actually resolves to, right before the connection is
//! made. The second check is the one that matters for a hostname pointing at
//! an internal address, and it runs on every redirect hop because the engine
//! resolves every hop.
use async_trait::async_trait;
use log::warn;
use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr};
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use url::Url;
use yaak_http::dns::AddressFilter;
use yaak_http::sender::{HttpResponse, HttpResponseEvent, HttpSender};
use yaak_http::types::SendableHttpRequest;
/// The destination policy, shared by every send: public addresses only, unless the operator
/// has said otherwise. A hosted server's "private network" is the cloud's, not the user's, so
/// the default is public-only; a self-hosted instance on a LAN can be told that its private
/// network *is* the user's, which is what `--allow-private-networks` means.
#[derive(Clone, Default)]
pub struct DestinationPolicy {
allow_private: bool,
}
impl DestinationPolicy {
pub fn new(allow_private: bool) -> Self {
Self { allow_private }
}
/// Check a URL before a hop is attempted: scheme and literal IPs. A hostname that passes
/// here still has its resolved addresses checked by [`Self::address_filter`].
pub fn check_url(&self, raw: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
let url = Url::parse(raw).map_err(|e| format!("Invalid URL {raw:?}: {e}"))?;
match url.scheme() {
"http" | "https" => {}
other => return Err(format!("Refusing to send over {other:?}; only http and https")),
}
let host = url.host_str().ok_or_else(|| format!("URL {raw:?} has no host"))?;
let host = host.trim_matches(|c| c == '[' || c == ']');
// A literal IP never reaches the resolver, so it is checked here. Hostnames are checked
// where their addresses become known.
if let Ok(ip) = host.parse::<IpAddr>() {
self.check_ip(ip)?;
}
Ok(())
}
/// The veto the engine's resolver applies to every address a hostname resolves to.
pub fn address_filter(&self) -> AddressFilter {
let policy = self.clone();
Arc::new(move |ip| policy.check_ip(ip))
}
pub fn check_ip(&self, ip: IpAddr) -> Result<(), String> {
if self.allow_private {
return Ok(());
}
match non_public_reason(ip) {
Some(reason) => Err(format!(
"Refusing to connect to {ip}: {reason}. This server only sends to public addresses"
)),
None => Ok(()),
}
}
}
/// Why an address is not a public internet address, or `None` if it is one.
///
/// Every range here is one a hosted relay must never be talked into reaching: the machine
/// itself, the network it sits on, and the link-local range where cloud metadata services
/// (169.254.169.254) live. IPv4 addresses carried inside fixed-layout IPv6 forms — IPv4-mapped,
/// the well-known NAT64 prefix, 6to4 — are unwrapped and judged as IPv4, since that is where
/// the packets end up; the NAT64 local-use range is refused outright. This is the stable-Rust
/// stand-in for `IpAddr::is_global`, which is still behind `#![feature(ip)]`; a network-specific
/// NAT64 prefix is not knowable here.
pub fn non_public_reason(ip: IpAddr) -> Option<&'static str> {
match ip {
IpAddr::V4(v4) => non_public_v4(v4),
IpAddr::V6(v6) => {
if let Some(v4) = v6.to_ipv4_mapped() {
return non_public_v4(v4);
}
if let Some(v4) = embedded_v4(&v6) {
return non_public_v4(v4);
}
if v6.is_loopback() {
Some("loopback")
} else if v6.is_unspecified() {
Some("unspecified")
} else if v6.is_unique_local() {
Some("unique local (fc00::/7)")
} else if v6.is_unicast_link_local() {
Some("link-local (fe80::/10)")
} else if v6.is_multicast() {
Some("multicast")
} else if v6.segments()[..3] == [0x64, 0xff9b, 1] {
Some("NAT64 local-use (64:ff9b:1::/48)")
} else if v6.segments()[..4] == [0x100, 0, 0, 0] {
Some("discard-only (100::/64)")
} else if (v6.segments()[0] & 0xffc0) == 0xfec0 {
Some("site-local (fec0::/10)")
} else if v6.segments()[0] == 0x2001 && v6.segments()[1] == 0x0db8 {
Some("documentation (2001:db8::/32)")
} else {
None
}
}
}
}
fn non_public_v4(v4: Ipv4Addr) -> Option<&'static str> {
let o = v4.octets();
if v4.is_loopback() {
Some("loopback (127.0.0.0/8)")
} else if v4.is_private() {
Some("private (10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16)")
} else if v4.is_link_local() {
Some("link-local (169.254.0.0/16, where cloud metadata lives)")
} else if v4.is_unspecified() || o[0] == 0 {
Some("this network (0.0.0.0/8)")
} else if o[0] == 100 && (o[1] & 0xc0) == 64 {
Some("carrier-grade NAT (100.64.0.0/10)")
} else if v4.is_broadcast() {
Some("broadcast")
} else if v4.is_multicast() {
Some("multicast (224.0.0.0/4)")
} else if o[0] >= 240 {
Some("reserved (240.0.0.0/4)")
} else if v4.is_documentation() {
Some("documentation")
} else if o[0] == 192 && o[1] == 0 && o[2] == 0 {
Some("IETF protocol assignments (192.0.0.0/24)")
} else if o[0] == 198 && (o[1] & 0xfe) == 18 {
Some("benchmarking (198.18.0.0/15)")
} else {
None
}
}
/// The IPv4 address an IPv6 address stands for, when it is one of the fixed-layout translation
/// forms: the NAT64 well-known prefix (64:ff9b::/96) or 6to4 (2002::/16, IPv4 in the next 32
/// bits). The NAT64 local-use range (64:ff9b:1::/48) is a pool operators carve their own
/// prefix from, at a length only they know, so it is refused wholesale in [`non_public_reason`]
/// rather than decoded — the same call `std`'s (still unstable) `Ipv6Addr::is_global` makes.
fn embedded_v4(v6: &Ipv6Addr) -> Option<Ipv4Addr> {
let s = v6.segments();
let o = v6.octets();
if s[0] == 0x64 && s[1] == 0xff9b && s[2..6].iter().all(|x| *x == 0) {
return Some(Ipv4Addr::new(o[12], o[13], o[14], o[15]));
}
if s[0] == 0x2002 {
return Some(Ipv4Addr::new(o[2], o[3], o[4], o[5]));
}
None
}
/// An [`HttpSender`] that checks each hop's URL against the policy before delegating.
///
/// The engine's redirect loop calls the sender once per hop with the hop's URL, so wrapping
/// the sender is what makes `Location:` headers subject to the same rules as the first URL —
/// including a redirect to a literal internal IP, which the resolver would never see.
pub struct GuardedSender<S> {
inner: S,
policy: DestinationPolicy,
}
impl<S: HttpSender> GuardedSender<S> {
pub fn new(inner: S, policy: DestinationPolicy) -> Self {
Self { inner, policy }
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl<S: HttpSender> HttpSender for GuardedSender<S> {
async fn send(
&self,
request: SendableHttpRequest,
event_tx: mpsc::Sender<HttpResponseEvent>,
) -> yaak_http::error::Result<HttpResponse> {
if let Err(reason) = self.policy.check_url(&request.url) {
warn!("Refused {} {}: {reason}", request.method, request.url);
return Err(yaak_http::error::Error::RequestError(reason));
}
self.inner.send(request, event_tx).await
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn ip(s: &str) -> IpAddr {
s.parse().unwrap()
}
#[test]
fn refuses_the_ranges_a_relay_must_never_reach() {
for addr in [
"127.0.0.1",
"127.9.9.9",
"10.0.0.1",
"172.16.0.1",
"172.31.255.255",
"192.168.1.1",
"169.254.169.254",
"169.254.0.1",
"0.0.0.0",
"100.64.0.1",
"255.255.255.255",
"224.0.0.1",
"240.0.0.1",
"::1",
"::",
"fc00::1",
"fd12::1",
"fe80::1",
"::ffff:127.0.0.1",
"::ffff:169.254.169.254",
"64:ff9b::7f00:1",
"ff02::1",
] {
assert!(non_public_reason(ip(addr)).is_some(), "{addr} should be refused");
}
}
#[test]
fn allows_public_addresses() {
for addr in [
"1.1.1.1",
"8.8.8.8",
"93.184.216.34",
"172.32.0.1",
"2606:4700:4700::1111",
] {
assert!(non_public_reason(ip(addr)).is_none(), "{addr} should be allowed");
}
}
#[test]
fn literal_private_addresses_in_urls_are_refused() {
let policy = DestinationPolicy::new(false);
assert!(policy.check_url("http://127.0.0.1/").is_err());
assert!(policy.check_url("http://[::1]/").is_err());
assert!(policy.check_url("http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data").is_err());
}
#[test]
fn allow_private_networks_opens_the_local_ranges_but_not_other_schemes() {
let policy = DestinationPolicy::new(true);
assert!(policy.check_url("http://127.0.0.1/").is_ok());
assert!(policy.check_ip(ip("10.0.0.1")).is_ok());
assert!(policy.check_ip(ip("169.254.169.254")).is_ok());
assert!(policy.check_url("file:///etc/passwd").is_err());
}
#[test]
fn only_http_schemes() {
let policy = DestinationPolicy::new(false);
assert!(policy.check_url("ftp://example.com/").is_err());
assert!(policy.check_url("file:///etc/passwd").is_err());
assert!(policy.check_url("https://example.com/").is_ok());
}
}
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//! Per-client rate limiting, kept deliberately small.
//!
//! One token bucket per client IP, refilled continuously, in a mutex-guarded
//! map that is swept of idle entries as it goes. Good enough to keep one
//! caller from monopolising a hosted instance; not a substitute for whatever
//! sits in front of it in production.
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::net::IpAddr;
use std::sync::Mutex;
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
pub struct RateLimiter {
per_minute: u32,
buckets: Mutex<HashMap<IpAddr, Bucket>>,
}
struct Bucket {
tokens: f64,
last: Instant,
}
impl RateLimiter {
/// `per_minute == 0` disables limiting.
pub fn new(per_minute: u32) -> Self {
Self { per_minute, buckets: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()) }
}
/// Take one token for `client`, or say how long until one is available.
pub fn check(&self, client: IpAddr) -> Result<(), Duration> {
if self.per_minute == 0 {
return Ok(());
}
let capacity = self.per_minute as f64;
let per_second = capacity / 60.0;
let now = Instant::now();
let mut buckets = self.buckets.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
// Sweep buckets that have been idle long enough to be full again; there is nothing
// to remember about them.
if buckets.len() > 1024 {
buckets.retain(|_, b| now.duration_since(b.last).as_secs_f64() * per_second < capacity);
}
let bucket = buckets.entry(client).or_insert(Bucket { tokens: capacity, last: now });
let elapsed = now.duration_since(bucket.last).as_secs_f64();
bucket.tokens = (bucket.tokens + elapsed * per_second).min(capacity);
bucket.last = now;
if bucket.tokens >= 1.0 {
bucket.tokens -= 1.0;
Ok(())
} else {
let wait = (1.0 - bucket.tokens) / per_second;
Err(Duration::from_secs_f64(wait.max(0.001)))
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn a_full_bucket_then_a_wait() {
let limiter = RateLimiter::new(3);
let ip: IpAddr = "203.0.113.5".parse().unwrap();
assert!(limiter.check(ip).is_ok());
assert!(limiter.check(ip).is_ok());
assert!(limiter.check(ip).is_ok());
let wait = limiter.check(ip).expect_err("fourth call in a burst should wait");
assert!(wait > Duration::ZERO && wait <= Duration::from_secs(20));
}
#[test]
fn clients_are_independent_and_zero_disables() {
let limiter = RateLimiter::new(1);
let a: IpAddr = "203.0.113.5".parse().unwrap();
let b: IpAddr = "203.0.113.6".parse().unwrap();
assert!(limiter.check(a).is_ok());
assert!(limiter.check(a).is_err());
assert!(limiter.check(b).is_ok());
let unlimited = RateLimiter::new(0);
for _ in 0..1000 {
assert!(unlimited.check(a).is_ok());
}
}
}
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//! yaak-web: the network half of Yaak in a browser.
//!
//! A tab can't see a response the way a desktop app can — CORS hides most
//! headers, redirects are followed silently, there is no timeline. So the tab
//! renders the request and hands it here; this process puts it on the network
//! with the desktop's own engine and streams back everything that happened,
//! for the tab to store. It keeps nothing: no database, no files, no session.
//!
//! One binary, configured by flags or `YAAK_WEB_*` environment variables.
//! See README.md for running and deploying it, and `guard.rs` for what it
//! refuses to talk to.
mod config;
mod guard;
mod limits;
mod send;
mod wire;
use axum::Router;
use axum::body::Body;
use axum::extract::{ConnectInfo, DefaultBodyLimit, Request, State};
use axum::http::{HeaderMap, HeaderValue, Method, StatusCode, header};
use axum::middleware::{self, Next};
use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Json, Response};
use axum::routing::{get, post};
use clap::Parser;
use config::Config;
use guard::DestinationPolicy;
use limits::RateLimiter;
use log::{info, warn};
use send::{Refusal, SendLimits};
use serde_json::json;
use std::net::{IpAddr, SocketAddr};
use std::path::Path;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
use tokio::sync::Semaphore;
use tower_http::compression::CompressionLayer;
use tower_http::cors::{AllowOrigin, CorsLayer};
use tower_http::services::{ServeDir, ServeFile};
use wire::SendRequest;
#[derive(Clone)]
struct AppState {
config: Arc<Config>,
limits: Arc<SendLimits>,
rate_limiter: Arc<RateLimiter>,
in_flight: Arc<Semaphore>,
}
#[tokio::main]
async fn main() {
env_logger::Builder::from_env(env_logger::Env::default().default_filter_or("info")).init();
let config = Config::parse();
let policy = DestinationPolicy::new(config.allow_private_networks);
if config.allow_private_networks {
warn!(
"Sends to loopback, private and link-local addresses are ALLOWED. Only run this way \
on an instance strangers cannot reach"
);
}
let state = AppState {
limits: Arc::new(SendLimits {
policy,
max_response_bytes: config.max_response_bytes,
max_timeout: Duration::from_secs(config.max_timeout_secs),
}),
rate_limiter: Arc::new(RateLimiter::new(config.rate_limit_per_minute)),
in_flight: Arc::new(Semaphore::new(config.max_concurrent)),
config: Arc::new(config),
};
let cors = CorsLayer::new()
.allow_methods([Method::GET, Method::POST, Method::OPTIONS])
.allow_headers([header::CONTENT_TYPE])
.allow_origin(allowed_origins(&state.config.allowed_origins));
let api = Router::new()
.route("/v1/health", get(health))
// A WebSocket or gRPC relay would sit beside this as `/v1/ws/relay` and `/v1/grpc/relay`
// on the same router, behind the same policy, limits and auth. Not built; see README.
.route("/v1/http/send", post(send_http))
.layer(DefaultBodyLimit::max(state.config.max_request_bytes))
.layer(cors)
.with_state(state.clone());
let app = match &state.config.serve {
Some(dir) => {
info!("Serving the web client from {}", dir.display());
api.merge(web_router(dir))
}
None => api,
};
let bind = state.config.bind;
let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind(bind).await.unwrap_or_else(|e| {
eprintln!("Failed to bind {bind}: {e}");
std::process::exit(1);
});
info!(
"yaak-web listening on http://{bind} (rate limit: {}/min)",
state.config.rate_limit_per_minute,
);
axum::serve(listener, app.into_make_service_with_connect_info::<SocketAddr>())
.with_graceful_shutdown(async {
let _ = tokio::signal::ctrl_c().await;
info!("Shutting down");
})
.await
.expect("server error");
}
/// The built web client, served on the same origin as the API.
///
/// This is what makes a single container zero-configuration: the tab's send URL is a path on
/// the page's own origin, so there is no CORS, no second service and no URL to bake in. It is
/// only a file server — a send behaves exactly as it does without this flag.
///
/// Merged as a fallback, so the `/v1` routes are matched first and a request that matches no
/// file at all gets `index.html` (the app routes client-side; a deep link must survive a
/// refresh).
fn web_router(dir: &Path) -> Router {
let index = ServeFile::new(dir.join("index.html"));
Router::new()
// `fallback`, not `not_found_service`: the app's own routes are real pages, so
// index.html is served with the 200 the browser expects, not a 404 carrying HTML.
.fallback_service(ServeDir::new(dir).fallback(index))
.layer(middleware::from_fn(cache_control))
.layer(CompressionLayer::new())
}
/// Vite gives everything in `/assets` a content-hashed name, so those can be cached forever.
/// Everything else — `index.html` above all, including the copy served for an unknown path —
/// must be revalidated, or a browser keeps serving the deploy before last.
async fn cache_control(req: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
let hashed_name = req.uri().path().starts_with("/assets/");
let mut res = next.run(req).await;
if !res.status().is_success() {
return res;
}
let is_html = res
.headers()
.get(header::CONTENT_TYPE)
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.is_some_and(|v| v.starts_with("text/html"));
let value = if hashed_name && !is_html {
"public, max-age=31536000, immutable"
} else {
"no-cache"
};
res.headers_mut().insert(header::CACHE_CONTROL, HeaderValue::from_static(value));
res
}
fn allowed_origins(origins: &[String]) -> AllowOrigin {
if origins.iter().any(|o| o.trim() == "*") {
return AllowOrigin::any();
}
let parsed: Vec<HeaderValue> =
origins.iter().filter_map(|o| HeaderValue::from_str(o.trim()).ok()).collect();
AllowOrigin::list(parsed)
}
async fn health(State(state): State<AppState>) -> impl IntoResponse {
Json(json!({
"ok": true,
"version": env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"),
"maxResponseBytes": state.config.max_response_bytes,
"maxTimeoutSecs": state.config.max_timeout_secs,
}))
}
fn error_response(status: StatusCode, message: impl Into<String>) -> Response {
let message = message.into();
(status, Json(json!({ "error": message }))).into_response()
}
/// The client's address for rate limiting: the socket peer, or the first `X-Forwarded-For`
/// hop when the operator has said the header can be trusted.
fn client_ip(config: &Config, headers: &HeaderMap, peer: SocketAddr) -> IpAddr {
if config.trust_forwarded_for
&& let Some(forwarded) = headers.get("x-forwarded-for").and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
&& let Some(first) = forwarded.split(',').next()
&& let Ok(ip) = first.trim().parse::<IpAddr>()
{
return ip;
}
peer.ip()
}
async fn send_http(
State(state): State<AppState>,
ConnectInfo(peer): ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>,
headers: HeaderMap,
Json(body): Json<SendRequest>,
) -> Response {
let ip = client_ip(&state.config, &headers, peer);
if let Err(wait) = state.rate_limiter.check(ip) {
warn!("Rate limited {ip}");
let mut res = error_response(
StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
format!("Rate limit reached; try again in {}s", wait.as_secs().max(1)),
);
res.headers_mut().insert(header::RETRY_AFTER, HeaderValue::from(wait.as_secs().max(1)));
return res;
}
let Ok(permit) = state.in_flight.clone().try_acquire_owned() else {
warn!("At capacity; refusing {ip}");
return error_response(StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE, "This server is at capacity");
};
let prepared = match send::prepare(state.limits.clone(), body).await {
Ok(p) => p,
Err(Refusal::Unsupported(m)) => return error_response(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, m),
Err(Refusal::Invalid(m)) => return error_response(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, m),
Err(Refusal::Destination(m)) => {
warn!("Refused send from {ip}: {m}");
return error_response(StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, m);
}
};
let description = prepared.describe();
info!("{ip} -> {description}");
let started = Instant::now();
let (tx, rx) = tokio::sync::mpsc::channel(send::FRAME_CHANNEL_CAPACITY);
tokio::spawn(async move {
prepared.run(tx).await;
send::log_outcome(&description, started, "finished");
drop(permit);
});
let stream = tokio_stream_from(rx);
Response::builder()
.status(StatusCode::OK)
.header(header::CONTENT_TYPE, "application/x-ndjson")
.header(header::CACHE_CONTROL, "no-store")
// Some reverse proxies buffer streamed responses unless told not to
.header("x-accel-buffering", "no")
.body(Body::from_stream(stream))
.expect("valid response")
}
fn tokio_stream_from<T: Send + 'static>(
mut rx: tokio::sync::mpsc::Receiver<T>,
) -> impl futures_util::Stream<Item = T> + Send + 'static {
futures_util::stream::poll_fn(move |cx| rx.poll_recv(cx))
}
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//! The one thing this binary does: execute a rendered request and stream back what happened.
//!
//! This is the "execute" half of the desktop's `send_http_request` — the part after rendering
//! and before storage — driven through the same `HttpTransaction` the desktop drives, with the
//! same redirect loop, cookie jar, decompression and timeline events. Everything the desktop
//! would write to its database is written to the reply stream instead, and the tab stores it.
use crate::guard::{DestinationPolicy, GuardedSender};
use crate::wire::{Frame, SendRequest};
use base64::Engine;
use bytes::Bytes;
use log::{info, warn};
use std::convert::Infallible;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
use tokio::io::AsyncReadExt;
use tokio::sync::{mpsc, watch};
use yaak_http::client::{HttpConnectionOptions, HttpConnectionProxySetting};
use yaak_http::cookies::CookieStore;
use yaak_http::sender::{HttpResponseEvent, ReqwestSender};
use yaak_http::transaction::HttpTransaction;
use yaak_http::types::{SendableHttpRequest, SendableHttpRequestOptions};
use yaak_models::models::HttpResponseHeader;
/// How many frames may sit unread by the client before body reading pauses. Backpressure, so a
/// slow tab slows the upstream read rather than filling memory.
pub const FRAME_CHANNEL_CAPACITY: usize = 64;
const EVENT_CHANNEL_CAPACITY: usize = 256;
const BODY_READ_CHUNK: usize = 64 * 1024;
/// What a send needs from the process, beyond the request itself.
pub struct SendLimits {
pub policy: DestinationPolicy,
pub max_response_bytes: usize,
pub max_timeout: Duration,
}
/// Why a send was refused before anything was put on the network. Distinct from a failure
/// mid-stream: these become a plain HTTP error, not a stream with an error frame.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum Refusal {
/// The request asks for something a browser-originated send cannot mean.
Unsupported(String),
/// The destination is not one this server will talk to.
Destination(String),
/// The request could not be turned into something sendable.
Invalid(String),
}
pub type FrameSender = mpsc::Sender<Result<Bytes, Infallible>>;
/// Check and prepare a send, then hand back the task that runs it. Refusals happen here, before
/// the caller has committed to a streaming response.
pub async fn prepare(limits: Arc<SendLimits>, send: SendRequest) -> Result<PreparedSend, Refusal> {
let request = send.request;
// The engine reads files for these body types. There are no files here that a browser tab
// could legitimately mean, and letting a request name a path on this machine would be a
// local file read for anyone who can reach the server.
if request.body_type.as_deref() == Some("binary") {
return Err(Refusal::Unsupported(
"Binary file bodies can't be sent from the browser: the server has no access to your files"
.to_string(),
));
}
if request.body_type.as_deref() == Some("multipart/form-data") {
let names_a_file =
request.body.get("form").and_then(|f| f.as_array()).is_some_and(|entries| {
entries.iter().any(|e| {
e.get("enabled").and_then(|v| v.as_bool()).unwrap_or(true)
&& e.get("file").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).is_some_and(|f| !f.is_empty())
})
});
if names_a_file {
return Err(Refusal::Unsupported(
"Multipart file fields can't be sent from the browser: the server has no access to your files"
.to_string(),
));
}
}
// The tab's requested timeout, capped. Zero means "none", which here means the cap.
let requested = if send.settings.timeout_ms > 0 {
Some(Duration::from_millis(send.settings.timeout_ms as u64))
} else {
None
};
let timeout = requested.map_or(limits.max_timeout, |t| t.min(limits.max_timeout));
let timeout_capped = requested.is_none_or(|t| t > limits.max_timeout);
let sendable = SendableHttpRequest::from_http_request(
&request,
SendableHttpRequestOptions {
timeout: Some(timeout),
follow_redirects: send.settings.follow_redirects,
},
)
.await
.map_err(|e| Refusal::Invalid(e.to_string()))?;
// The first hop, checked up front so a bad destination is a clean refusal rather than a
// stream that opens and immediately errors. Every later hop is checked by GuardedSender.
limits.policy.check_url(&sendable.url).map_err(Refusal::Destination)?;
Ok(PreparedSend {
limits,
sendable,
settings: send.settings,
cookies: send.cookies,
timeout,
timeout_capped,
})
}
pub struct PreparedSend {
limits: Arc<SendLimits>,
sendable: SendableHttpRequest,
settings: yaak_models::models::HttpSendSettings,
cookies: Option<Vec<yaak_models::models::Cookie>>,
timeout: Duration,
timeout_capped: bool,
}
impl PreparedSend {
pub fn describe(&self) -> String {
format!("{} {}", self.sendable.method, self.sendable.url)
}
/// Run the send, writing frames to `frames` until the terminal frame. Returns when the
/// stream is complete or the client has gone away.
pub async fn run(mut self, frames: FrameSender) {
let cookie_store = self.cookies.take().map(CookieStore::from_cookies);
let store_for_result = cookie_store.clone();
let outcome = self.execute(frames.clone(), cookie_store).await;
let cookies = store_for_result.as_ref().map(|s| s.get_all_cookies());
let terminal = match outcome {
Ok(done) => Frame::Done {
elapsed: done.elapsed,
content_length: done.content_length,
content_length_compressed: done.content_length_compressed,
cookies,
},
Err(message) => Frame::Error { message, cookies },
};
let _ = write_frame(&frames, &terminal).await;
}
async fn execute(
self,
frames: FrameSender,
cookie_store: Option<CookieStore>,
) -> Result<DoneStats, String> {
let limits = self.limits;
let (client, resolver) = HttpConnectionOptions {
id: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
validate_certificates: self.settings.validate_certificates,
// The proxy connects directly. Going through a system proxy would move DNS, and
// therefore the address check, somewhere this process can't see.
proxy: HttpConnectionProxySetting::Disabled,
client_certificate: None,
dns_overrides: Vec::new(),
address_filter: Some(limits.policy.address_filter()),
}
.build_client()
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to build HTTP client: {e}"))?;
// Timeline events go into the same frame stream as everything else, as they happen.
// The desktop persists them from a task like this one; here the task serialises them.
let (event_tx, mut event_rx) = mpsc::channel::<HttpResponseEvent>(EVENT_CHANNEL_CAPACITY);
resolver.set_event_sender(Some(event_tx.clone())).await;
let dns_elapsed = Arc::new(AtomicU64::new(0));
let event_frames = frames.clone();
let event_dns = dns_elapsed.clone();
let event_task = tokio::spawn(async move {
while let Some(event) = event_rx.recv().await {
if let HttpResponseEvent::DnsResolved { duration, .. } = &event {
event_dns.store(*duration, Ordering::Relaxed);
}
let frame = Frame::Event { event: event.into() };
if write_frame(&event_frames, &frame).await.is_err() {
break;
}
}
});
// Cancellation: the client hanging up, or the overall deadline. The deadline exists
// because a per-hop timeout times each hop separately; ten slow redirects must not add
// up to ten timeouts.
let (cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = watch::channel(false);
let deadline = self.timeout * 2 + Duration::from_secs(5);
let deadline_cancel = cancel_tx.clone();
let deadline_task = tokio::spawn(async move {
tokio::time::sleep(deadline).await;
let _ = deadline_cancel.send(true);
});
let hangup_frames = frames.clone();
let hangup_task = tokio::spawn(async move {
hangup_frames.closed().await;
let _ = cancel_tx.send(true);
});
if self.timeout_capped {
let _ = event_tx.try_send(HttpResponseEvent::Info(format!(
"Timeout set to {:?} (this server's ceiling)",
self.timeout
)));
}
let sender = GuardedSender::new(ReqwestSender::with_client(client), limits.policy.clone());
let transaction = match cookie_store {
Some(store) => HttpTransaction::with_cookie_behavior(
sender,
store,
self.settings.send_cookies,
self.settings.store_cookies,
),
None => HttpTransaction::new(sender),
};
let started_at = Instant::now();
let result = transaction
.execute_with_cancellation(self.sendable, cancel_rx.clone(), event_tx.clone())
.await;
resolver.set_event_sender(None).await;
let mut response = match result {
Ok(response) => response,
Err(err) => {
drop(event_tx);
let _ = event_task.await;
deadline_task.abort();
hangup_task.abort();
return Err(describe_error(&err));
}
};
let elapsed_headers = started_at.elapsed().as_millis() as u64;
let head = Frame::Response {
status: response.status,
status_reason: response.status_reason.clone(),
url: response.url.clone(),
remote_addr: response.remote_addr.clone(),
version: response.version.clone(),
headers: to_wire_headers(&response.headers),
request_headers: to_wire_headers(&response.request_headers),
content_length: response.content_length,
elapsed_headers,
elapsed_dns: dns_elapsed.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
};
write_frame(&frames, &head).await.map_err(|_| "Client went away".to_string())?;
let declared_length = response.content_length;
let mut body = response
.into_body_stream()
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to read response body: {e}"))?;
let mut buf = vec![0u8; BODY_READ_CHUNK];
let mut total: usize = 0;
let mut cancel_rx = cancel_rx;
let base64 = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD;
let read_result: Result<(), String> = loop {
if *cancel_rx.borrow() {
break Err("Request canceled".to_string());
}
let read = tokio::select! {
biased;
_ = cancel_rx.changed() => break Err("Request canceled".to_string()),
r = body.read(&mut buf) => r,
};
match read {
Ok(0) => break Ok(()),
Ok(n) => {
total += n;
if total > limits.max_response_bytes {
break Err(format!(
"Response body exceeds this server's limit of {} bytes",
limits.max_response_bytes
));
}
let frame = Frame::Body { data: base64.encode(&buf[..n]) };
if write_frame(&frames, &frame).await.is_err() {
break Err("Client went away".to_string());
}
}
Err(e) => break Err(format!("Failed to read response body: {e}")),
}
};
drop(body);
// Let the timeline drain before the terminal frame, so nothing arrives after "done".
drop(event_tx);
let _ = event_task.await;
deadline_task.abort();
hangup_task.abort();
read_result?;
Ok(DoneStats {
elapsed: started_at.elapsed().as_millis() as u64,
content_length: total as u64,
content_length_compressed: declared_length.unwrap_or(total as u64),
})
}
}
/// A send error as a sentence, not a debug dump.
///
/// A connection error from reqwest arrives wrapped several layers deep, and the layer that
/// says something useful — "Refusing to connect to ::1: loopback" — is the innermost. The
/// desktop shows the outer `Debug`; a stranger reading its reply deserves the reason.
fn describe_error(err: &yaak_http::error::Error) -> String {
match err {
yaak_http::error::Error::Client(e) => {
let mut leaf: &dyn std::error::Error = e;
while let Some(next) = leaf.source() {
leaf = next;
}
let outer = e.to_string();
let inner = leaf.to_string();
if inner == outer { outer } else { format!("{outer}: {inner}") }
}
yaak_http::error::Error::RequestError(message) => format!("Request failed: {message}"),
other => other.to_string(),
}
}
struct DoneStats {
elapsed: u64,
content_length: u64,
content_length_compressed: u64,
}
fn to_wire_headers(headers: &[(String, String)]) -> Vec<HttpResponseHeader> {
headers
.iter()
.map(|(name, value)| HttpResponseHeader { name: name.clone(), value: value.clone() })
.collect()
}
async fn write_frame(frames: &FrameSender, frame: &Frame) -> Result<(), ()> {
let mut line = match serde_json::to_vec(frame) {
Ok(v) => v,
Err(e) => {
warn!("Failed to serialize frame: {e}");
return Err(());
}
};
line.push(b'\n');
frames.send(Ok(Bytes::from(line))).await.map_err(|_| ())
}
/// Log a finished send at info: destination, outcome, and how long, never the content.
pub fn log_outcome(description: &str, started: Instant, outcome: &str) {
info!("{description} -> {outcome} in {:?}", started.elapsed());
}
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//! What crosses the wire between a tab and this server.
//!
//! One `POST /v1/http/send` carries a request the tab has already rendered —
//! templates resolved, inheritance applied — plus the send settings and the
//! cookies the send starts with. The reply is a stream of newline-delimited
//! JSON frames: timeline events as they happen, the response head as soon as
//! headers arrive, body chunks as they are read, and one terminal frame.
//!
//! Nothing here names a workspace, a request id, or a response id. The server
//! does not know what the tab will call this response; it only knows what came
//! back.
//!
//! The TypeScript side of this contract is generated from these types into
//! `bindings/` (`cargo test -p yaak-web`) and published to the tab as
//! `@yaakapp-internal/web`, so a change here is a type error there.
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use ts_rs::TS;
use yaak_models::models::{
Cookie, HttpRequest, HttpResponseEventData, HttpResponseHeader, HttpSendSettings,
};
/// The body of `POST /v1/http/send`.
#[derive(Deserialize, Debug, TS)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
#[ts(export, export_to = "gen_web.ts")]
pub struct SendRequest {
/// The request to send, in the desktop's own model shape but with every template already
/// rendered by the tab. The server builds the URL, headers and body from it exactly the way
/// the desktop does after rendering.
pub request: HttpRequest,
/// The resolved settings, values only. Where they came from is the tab's to record in
/// its timeline; the server only needs to obey them.
pub settings: HttpSendSettings,
/// The cookies to start with. `None` means no jar at all: nothing sent, nothing kept.
#[serde(default)]
pub cookies: Option<Vec<Cookie>>,
}
/// One line of the reply stream. Tags are snake_case like the timeline event tags; fields are
/// camelCase like every model the tab stores.
#[derive(Serialize, Debug, TS)]
#[serde(
tag = "type",
rename_all = "snake_case",
rename_all_fields = "camelCase"
)]
#[ts(export, export_to = "gen_web.ts")]
pub enum Frame {
/// A timeline event, in the same shape the desktop stores. Interleaved with everything
/// else in the order the engine produced it.
Event { event: HttpResponseEventData },
/// The response head. Sent once, as soon as the final hop's headers are in — before any of
/// the body — so the tab can show status and headers while the body streams.
Response {
status: u16,
status_reason: Option<String>,
/// The URL that answered, after redirects.
url: String,
remote_addr: Option<String>,
version: Option<String>,
headers: Vec<HttpResponseHeader>,
/// The headers that were actually sent on the final hop, cookies and all.
request_headers: Vec<HttpResponseHeader>,
/// `Content-Length` as declared by the server, if it declared one.
#[ts(type = "number | null")]
content_length: Option<u64>,
/// Milliseconds from the start of the send to the response head.
#[ts(type = "number")]
elapsed_headers: u64,
/// Milliseconds spent in DNS on the last lookup, or zero.
#[ts(type = "number")]
elapsed_dns: u64,
},
/// A piece of the response body, decompressed, base64-encoded.
Body { data: String },
/// The send finished. The last frame on a successful stream.
Done {
/// Milliseconds from the start of the send to the end of the body.
#[ts(type = "number")]
elapsed: u64,
/// Bytes of body relayed, after decompression.
#[ts(type = "number")]
content_length: u64,
/// Bytes on the wire as declared by the server, or the relayed size when unknown.
#[ts(type = "number")]
content_length_compressed: u64,
/// The jar as the send left it, for the tab to persist. `None` when the tab sent none.
cookies: Option<Vec<Cookie>>,
},
/// The send failed. The last frame on a failed stream. Cookies collected before the failure
/// still come back — the transaction may have set some before the hop that failed.
Error {
message: String,
cookies: Option<Vec<Cookie>>,
},
}