Application sandboxing (nixpak/bubblewrap) and Linux hardening knowledge for this repository. For the repository security policy, architecture and audit status, see SECURITY.md; for temporary exceptions and known gaps, see WORKAROUNDS.md.

Goal

System Level: Protect critical files from being accessed by untrusted applications.
1. Such as browser cookies, SSH keys, etc.
Per-App Level: Prevent untrusted applications(such as closed-source apps) from:
1. Accessing files they shouldn't.
  - Such as a malicious application accessing your browser's cookies, SSH keys, etc.
2. Accessing the network when they don't need to.
3. Accessing hardware devices they don't need.

Current Structure

1. System Level

AppArmor (apparmor/): AppArmor profiles and configuration
Kernel & process hardening (kernel-hardening.nix): sysctl baseline and unused-module deny list; rationale and verification live in SECURITY.md.

2. Per-App Level

Nixpak (nixpaks/): Bubblewrap-based sandboxing for applications
- Firefox configuration
- QQ (Chinese messaging app) configuration
- Telegram Desktop configuration
- Modular system with reusable components
Bubblewrap (bwraps/): Direct bubblewrap configurations
- WeChat sandboxing configuration

Current Implementation Status

Component	Status	Notes
AppArmor Profiles	🚧 WIP	Basic structure in place
Nixpak Firefox	✅ Active	Firefox sandboxing via nixpak
Nixpak QQ	✅ Active	QQ application sandboxing
Nixpak Telegram	✅ Active	Telegram Desktop sandboxing
Bubblewrap WeChat	✅ Active	WeChat specific sandboxing

Directory Structure

hardening/
├── README.md
├── kernel-hardening.nix # sysctl baseline + unused-module deny list
├── apparmor/           # AppArmor security profiles
│   └── default.nix
├── bwraps/            # Direct bubblewrap configurations
│   ├── default.nix
│   └── wechat.nix
└── nixpaks/           # Nixpak application sandboxing
    ├── default.nix
    ├── firefox.nix
    ├── qq.nix
    ├── telegram-desktop.nix
    └── modules/       # Reusable nixpak modules
        ├── custom-policy.nix
        ├── gui-base.nix
        └── network.nix

System Hardening

Apparmor: roddhjav/apparmor.d
- https://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor/-/wikis/Documentation
- AppArmor.d is a set of over 1500 AppArmor profiles whose aim is to confine most Linux based applications and processes.
- But its profiles assume an FHS filesystem, so most of them never match the Nix store paths a NixOS system actually executes.
- Apparmor on NixOS Roadmap:
  - https://discourse.nixos.org/t/apparmor-on-nixos-roadmap/57217
  - https://github.com/LordGrimmauld/aa-alias-manager
SELinux: too complex, not recommended for personal use.

Application Sandboxing

Bubblewrap: nixpak, more secure than firejail, but no batteries included.
- NixOS's FHSEnv is implemented using bubblewrap by default.
Firejail: A SUID security sandbox with hundreds of security profiles for many common applications in the default installation.
- https://wiki.nixos.org/wiki/Firejail
- Firejail needs SUID to work, which is considered a security risk - Does firejail improve the security of my system?
Systemd/Hardening: Systemd also provides some sandboxing features.

NOTE

Running untrusted code is never safe, kernel hardening & sandboxing cannot change this; run untrusted code in a VM on an isolated network. The threat model lives in SECURITY.md.

References

Harden your NixOS workstation - dataswamp
Linux Insecurities - Madaidans
Sandboxing all programs by default - NixOS Discourse
Paranoid NixOS Setup - xeiaso
nix-mineral: NixOS module for convenient system hardening.
apparmor configs:
- https://github.com/zramctl/dotfiles/blob/4fe177f6984154960942bb47d5a375098ec6ed6a/modules/nixos/security/apparmor.nix#L4
- https://git.grimmauld.de/Grimmauld/grimm-nixos-laptop/src/branch/main/hardening