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ryan4yin | 二花 7cfda39c2c feat: log in and sudo over SSH with a CanoKey touch
The CanoKey resident SSH key (`ryan@canokey-moe`, the backup once a new primary key is enrolled) is now authorized for ryan and root on every host, and sudo on server and agent hosts accepts its touch through the forwarded agent (`pam_rssh`). Without the key or a forwarded agent, sudo asks for the password and login falls back to the file keys. Only `canokeySshKeys` can satisfy sudo.

Risks to weigh:

- Colmena deploys need one touch per host connection, since the agent offers the CanoKey key first.
- Desktops now forward the agent to every `hostsAddr` alias, as they already did for `192.168.*`; while a session is open, root there can request signatures, each needing a touch.

### Verification

- `just test` exits 0; CI passed on the first commit.
- Evaluated: sudo PAM stack `rssh` → `unix` → `deny` on shoryu, kana, akane and k3s-test-1-master-1, ai-niri keeps `pam_u2f`; shoryu root and ryan list `ryan@canokey-moe`.
- Not yet verified on a running host.

### Manual step after merge

Deploy the servers, then `just niri`; close old multiplexed connections (`ssh -O exit <host>`) and try `sudo true` over SSH.

AI assistance: DeepSeek Harness (claude-opus-5-5).

Assisted-by: DeepSeek Harness (claude-opus-5-5)
2026-11-06 03:26:59 -06:00

21 lines
559 B
Nix

{
lib,
pkgs,
myvars,
...
}:
{
# sudo over SSH accepts a CanoKey touch through the forwarded agent; without
# it, sudo asks for the password as before. Only the hardware-backed keys are
# trusted, so a file key loaded in the agent cannot sign for sudo silently.
# Setup and limits: docs/security-keys.md.
security.pam.rssh = {
enable = true;
settings = {
auth_key_file = "${pkgs.writeText "sudo-ssh-agent-keys" (lib.concatLines myvars.canokeySshKeys)}";
cue = true;
};
};
security.pam.services.sudo.rssh = true;
}