Aquamarine builds for ai and shoukei across the three platforms, with both
daemons logging in as root. They authenticate with their passphrase-free SSH
host keys, and ssh_known_hosts now carries each builder's address.
Assisted-by: DeepSeek Harness 0.2.0-rc.2 (deepseek-flash)
test-instrumentation.nix sets serial-getty@ttyS0.enable = false at normal priority to keep ttyS0 free for the test backdoor console, while qemu-guest.nix set it to true at normal priority. Two conflicting normal-priority definitions made `nix flake check` fail while evaluating packages.x86_64-linux.ruby-nixos-tests.
Use lib.mkDefault so the test framework wins in tests while ordinary QEMU guests still enable the serial getty.
* fix(colmena): expose colmenaHive for the new evaluator
nixpkgs now ships the nix-community Colmena rewrite, whose default
evaluator reads an evaluated colmenaHive flake output instead of the raw
colmena hive. Without it every colmena apply recipe failed with
"does not provide attribute colmenaHive".
Add a colmena input pinned to the same v0.5.0 as nixpkgs and expose
colmenaHive = colmena.lib.makeHive <raw hive>, with the raw hive kept as
an internal binding rather than a flake output of its own.
* chore: clean up stale colmena and aquamarine references
- point the Colmena links at nix-community/colmena after the move
- rename the security-aquamarine-metrics test to youko-metrics (it
already tested youko) and update the outputs README
- drop the commented aquamarine remote-builder example
environment.enableAllTerminfo installs every terminal's terminfo, including rxvt-unicode, which no longer builds with GCC 16 (NixOS/nixpkgs#568896). Install just the terminals we use (alacritty, foot, ghostty, kitty) instead. This also makes the aarch64 jasper workaround unnecessary.
Hosts used to trust the router as the only boundary (servers ran with the
firewall off; service ports were opened globally), so any LAN device could
reach every host service. Move filtering to the hosts as defence in depth
behind the router, which keeps its firewall on and uses a port mapping for
the few ports we actually need.
- base: nftables backend; deny inbound by default; trust the home LAN by
source and the tailnet by interface (restrict the tailnet with ACLs);
suppress per-service `openFirewall` global ports; allow node_exporter only
from the monitoring host. The local podman bridge, the tailnet and the pod
CIDRs are accepted only after the node_exporter drop.
- servers: stop disabling the firewall; drop redundant global port opens
(caddy 80/443, NFS 2049, Jellyfin, localsend/test ports); delete the
redundant desktop firewall module; aarch64/riscv64 import the firewall
explicitly (akane was missing it).
- k3s: Cilium pods (10.0.0.0/8, fd00::/8) may reach host services; drop the
flannel-era cni0/flannel.1 trust.
- youko: postgres listens on localhost + the LAN with pg_hba limited to the
LAN; the NFS export stays LAN-scoped; remove the unauthenticated v2ray
proxy.
- tests: `security-firewall` asserts every host runs the shared firewall, has
the LAN CIDR rule and no global ports.
The k3s-test workers never ran (they were stuck waiting for volume
binding) and will be re-added as microVMs, so remove their KubeVirt
configs and everything that only existed for KubeVirt guests:
- hosts/k8s/k3s-test-1-worker-{1,2,3} and their outputs
- lib/genKubeVirtGuestModule.nix and lib/genK3sAgentModule.nix (the
latter was only used by the workers)
- the KubeVirt image upload recipes (upload-vm, upload-idols,
upload-k3s-test) and the kubevirt image package in the idols outputs
- refresh the docs; keep only accurate historical mentions (e.g. the
restic backup path must stay as it is)
The file is not KubeVirt-specific: it is the hardware configuration for
any QEMU guest that boots from a disk (KubeVirt or libvirt). All it does
is pull in qemu-guest.nix and set fileSystems."/" from the disk labeled
nixos.
* feat(btrbk): make snapshots explicit and guarded
Replace the always-on, hardcoded module with modules.btrbk options (enable/volume/subvolume/snapshotDir/target/onCalendar), and assert the btrfs top-level subvolume is mounted so a missing mount fails evaluation instead of silently failing at runtime.
Store snapshots in the @snapshots subvolume (snapshot_dir=@snapshots) rather than next to the live subvolume, make the off-host target explicit and off by default, and document that local snapshots are not off-host backups.
Enable the feature explicitly on idols-ai, shoukei and the three kubevirt hosts; qemu-guest now disables it through the option. Add eval tests for shoukei and ai.
* feat(monitoring): alert on btrbk snapshot failure
Add HostBtrbkSnapshotFailed on node_systemd_unit_state for btrbk-btrbk.service, so a broken snapshot schedule alerts instead of only surfacing in the journal.
* security: make firewall secure-by-default, disable explicitly on servers
Flip the base firewall default to ON so new hosts are protected by default. Servers keep the firewall off (trusted internal LAN, WAN protected at the router) via explicit overrides in modules/nixos/server/{server,server-aarch64}.nix. Behavior-preserving for all 18 current hosts; adds a security-firewall eval test guarding the per-host state.
* test: fix security-firewall eval test to scalar per-host values
* security: enable AppArmor (complain) on all Linux hosts
* security: bind aquamarine metrics exporters to loopback
* security: restrict k3s kubeconfig file mode to 600
* security: disable SSH X11 forwarding on servers, keep on desktops
* security: add conservative systemd hardening to aquamarine services
* docs(apparmor): correct FHS-alias comment (nixpkgs has no broad FHS layer)
nixpkgs only creates /run/current-system, /usr/bin/env and /bin/sh; it does not
provide a broad FHS->store alias tree, so FHS-oriented abstractions are incomplete
on NixOS. They are safe only because the profiles run in complain mode.
* fix(aquamarine): scrape same-host exporters over loopback
The v2ray/postgres/sftpgo exporters were bound to 127.0.0.1 but VictoriaMetrics
scraped them via the host's routable IP, so those scrapes refused connections.
Point the three same-host scrape targets at 127.0.0.1 (VM runs on the same host).
node-exporter keeps the host IP since it binds 0.0.0.0.
* Revert "security: add conservative systemd hardening to aquamarine services"
This reverts commit f9cf99dadb.