agenix's darwin module honours age.secrets.<name>.path and applies owner and
mode itself, so the environment.etc links and the postActivation chown/chmod
that re-applied them go away.
Assisted-by: Claude Code (claude-opus-5-5)
Merge the three runtime-validation files into one concise record, update the interactive browser and Zoom results, and document the intentional Chromium host-loopback and Brave/Edge no-media exceptions. Tighten the remaining cookie-crypto workaround and the smoke-test prerequisites.
Assisted-by: DeepSeek Harness (deepseek-flash)
* refactor(nixpak): unify desktop app sandboxes
Move common GUI, portal, and network policy into reusable modules and migrate browsers plus Zoom/WeChat/QQ/Telegram to the same boundary.
Assisted-by: DeepSeek Harness (deepseek-flash)
* fix(nixpak): stop exposing the system D-Bus to apps
* fix(nixpak): bind only the PulseAudio socket
* feat(nixpak): run apps in a new session tied to the launcher
* feat(nixpak): start apps from an allowlisted environment
* feat(nixpak): isolate app networking with pasta
* fix(nixpak): keep Firefox on the host network
Assisted-by: Claude Code (claude-opus-5-5)
The homelab hosts accept root SSH with long-lived file keys, run several
exposed services with almost no systemd sandboxing, and keep no audit trail of
privileged actions. Close those three gaps, weighing each measure against its
cost instead of adopting a policy wholesale.
SSH
- Turn off KbdInteractiveAuthentication: nixpkgs defaults it to true and PAM
then still accepts the Unix password despite PasswordAuthentication = false.
- authorizedKeysInHomedir = false: only keys declared in Nix take effect;
youko keeps Gitea's forced-command file through `Match User gitea`.
- Pin aquamarine's passphrase-free remote-builder keys to
`restrict,command="nix-daemon --stdio --store daemon"`, so builds run in the
system daemon instead of an audited root login session.
systemd sandboxing
- Add the mylib.systemdHardening preset and apply it to the exposed, weakly
sandboxed services: caddy 7.8 -> 1.5, vmalert 8.2 -> 1.4, rustfs 6.6 -> 1.4,
whisper-asr 7.7 -> 1.6. An eval test pins the key restrictions.
- Rejected: a global all-keys policy (<=0.2 score gains on services nixpkgs
already sandboxes) and per-service confinement (bind paths to maintain).
auditd on all four hosts, reusing nixpkgs' loader and unit
- Audit login sessions only: a first `-a never,task -F auid=unset` rule keeps
services out of the per-syscall audit path. A compromised service is
therefore unrecorded until it opens a session.
- Record root commands, credential and host-key access, writes to SSH, account,
PAM, Nix-trust and audit configuration, module loads and session denials.
- Rejected: global denial logging, service-UID watches and
--loginuid-immutable (the kernel already records loginuid changes).
Verified on all four hosts after deployment: zero failed units, k3s 6/6 Ready,
and the exposed services healthy.
Assisted-by: Claude Code (claude-opus-5-5)
k8s-gitops#54 merged and reconciled, a full cold start of all six guests
brought the VIP back without manual action, and a probe from a pod shows
2379 denied while 2381 stays open. SECURITY.md records the fix and the
probe; the workaround row and its TODO entry are gone.
Assisted-by: DeepSeek Harness (gpt-6-astra)
Baseline sysctls, exporter binds and the #399/#400/#401 rules verified
live on 13 hosts; kiali self-escalation and the list-vs-get probe blind
spot recorded; WA-043 registers the k3s-test-1 Cilium/kube-vip bootstrap
cycle (WA-040 is the Root CA blacklist row); the TODO table gains the
cluster-recovery line. The same section records the manual recovery and
its fix in k8s-gitops, plus the 2026-10-24 full cold start that brought
the VIP back without manual action; WA-043 drops when #54 merges.
Assisted-by: DeepSeek Harness (gpt-6-astra)
No host defines a *-nixos-tests output; the pod firewall drops 5900-5903
from pod sources; the mihomo core keeps geodata and cache in its
StateDirectory; WA-020 was used twice and the cited WA-028 had no row.
`just test` has enforced the suite result since #350: the recipe raises unless
`evalTests` is `true`, so a zero exit already means pass. Update the places that
still described the old raw-`nix eval` behaviour: AGENTS.md, README.md,
SECURITY.md, outputs/README.md, and the nix-config-debug / nix-config-new-host /
nix-config-update skills.
The exit-0 caveat is kept only where the raw `nix eval .#evalTests` command is
documented, because that command genuinely exits 0 even on `false`.
* feat(restic): verify the repository after each backup
* feat(youko): snapshot the restic store hourly
* docs(backup): document the snapshot and check layers
* fix(postgres): require a password for superuser over TCP
* test: assert the postgres loopback auth rules
* fix(darwin): keep root-only agenix secrets root-only
* docs(security): record the local auth boundaries and retire WA-015
* fix(nfs): restrict the golden export to its real clients
* fix(libvirt): bind VNC consoles to loopback
* fix(firewall): drop VNC ports on every host
* docs(security): record the NFS and VNC boundaries
* fix(k3s): deny credential-bearing host ports to pod sources
* test: assert the k3s pod firewall drops sensitive ports
* docs(security): record the pod firewall boundary
node_exporter listened on 0.0.0.0, so access control rested entirely on
the nftables allowlist. Bind node/smartctl exporters to the host static
LAN IPv4 (the same address VictoriaMetrics scrapes), keeping the socket
off tailscale/bridge interfaces even if the firewall regresses.
Hosts without a static LAN address (shoukei, akane) now run no exporters
at all instead of loopback-bound ones nobody scrapes; akane, a UTM VM,
previously ran a loopback smartctl exporter with no physical disks.
LAN-bound exporters also get the boot-race treatment from #372
(network-online ordering plus patient restart); loopback-bound hosts
must not pull in network-online because NM wait-online would stall
their offline boots.
The optional kernel reboot-visibility change was closed without merging, so remove the planned-reporter wording. Replace it with the manual booted-vs-selected kernel check and update the P1 TODO accordingly.
Add SECURITY.md covering the threat model, trust boundaries,
proportionate kernel/process hardening, the update/reboot routine and
remaining prioritized work. Record the dated read-only audit findings
(listeners, privileged workloads, effective RBAC, secret metadata and
sandbox/SSH boundaries) separately from planned controls and runtime
verification.
Define agent-first diagnosis: scoped root read-only access on homelab
hosts, and normal-user diagnostics on core desktops with no new sudo
grants. Add canonical domain-based k3s API endpoint regression tests,
record the unverified Darwin secret-ownership concern as WA-015, and
correct comments claiming mode 0000 blocks privileged root.
Ryan Yin
ryan4yin | 二花