From a9d38491f0f53d21e4b1b7cc5a4e4e62c379cf5d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?ryan4yin=20=7C=20=E4=BA=8C=E8=8A=B1?= Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 22:56:41 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] feat(git): sign commits with the CanoKey OpenPGP key, reuse SSH 30 s (#535) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit * feat(ssh): reuse every connection for 30 s to save touches Assisted-by: DeepSeek Harness (claude-opus-5-5) * feat(git): sign commits with the OpenPGP key on the CanoKeys Assisted-by: DeepSeek Harness (claude-opus-5-5) Assisted-by: DeepSeek Harness (claude-fable-5-2) * flake.lock: Update Flake lock file updates: • Updated input 'mysecrets': 'git+ssh://git@github.com/ryan4yin/nix-secrets.git?ref=refs/heads/main&rev=6ab2a713e5938e1bb8ef2d33acab632ba0bd5331&shallow=1' (2026-11-11) → 'git+ssh://git@github.com/ryan4yin/nix-secrets.git?ref=refs/heads/main&rev=eba74369427e98b0246f6f0f35e80ddcc6808995&shallow=1' (2026-11-19) --- docs/SECURITY.md | 2 +- docs/security-keys.md | 134 ++++++++++++++++++------- flake.lock | 6 +- home/base/README.md | 1 + home/base/gui/git-signing.nix | 17 ++++ home/base/tui/gpg/README.md | 9 +- home/base/tui/password-store/README.md | 7 +- home/base/tui/ssh.nix | 9 +- scripts/gpg_canokey.py | 2 +- 9 files changed, 134 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-) create mode 100644 home/base/gui/git-signing.nix diff --git a/docs/SECURITY.md b/docs/SECURITY.md index 9f2cdac7..855e4450 100644 --- a/docs/SECURITY.md +++ b/docs/SECURITY.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ small, reversible controls and narrow exceptions; benchmark before adopting expe | k3s | Three control-plane and three worker MicroVMs; Cilium, API VIP and NFS CSI | Cluster-admin, privileged/host-mounted pods and writable NFS data are powerful trust boundaries | | MicroVM storage | Host store shared read-only through virtiofs; guest `/etc`, `/var` and `/home` persisted in separate images | Read-only store does not isolate the host-side virtiofs implementation or protect writable guest state | | Desktop apps | Selected apps use nixpak/bubblewrap; Podman is rootless | Rules and shared directories vary per app; user namespaces are needed for these sandboxes | -| Security keys | idols-ai/shoukei use a CanoKey for touch-based sudo (pam_u2f, password fallback; servers via pam_rssh and the forwarded agent), a resident `ed25519-sk` SSH key per CanoKey as the only user SSH keys for GitHub and all hosts, FIDO2 LUKS unlock on shoukei and on-card OpenPGP subkeys; key management happens only in the phone app ([setup](./security-keys.md)) | Touch-only sudo can be triggered by any same-user process, and on a server by root through the forwarded agent; losing both CanoKeys leaves only root logins with the `romantic` recovery key | +| Security keys | idols-ai/shoukei use a CanoKey for touch-based sudo (pam_u2f, password fallback; servers via pam_rssh and the forwarded agent), a resident `ed25519-sk` SSH key per CanoKey as the only user SSH keys for GitHub and all hosts, FIDO2 LUKS unlock on shoukei and on-card OpenPGP subkeys; key management happens only in the phone app ([setup](./security-keys.md)) | Touch-only sudo can be triggered by any same-user process, and on a server by root through the forwarded agent; losing both CanoKeys leaves only root logins with the `romantic` recovery key; an OpenPGP touch and an SSH connection each stay usable by same-user processes for 30 s | | Secrets | agenix declarations here, encrypted data in the private nix-secrets repository | Recipients and plaintext file permissions must be reviewed; root on a recipient can read its decrypted secrets | | Supply chain | Locked flake inputs; explicit binary-cache trust keys on NixOS; normal user is not a Nix trusted-user | A trusted cache or imported Nix module can supply code executed as root; a lock file is not a security audit | | Recovery | NixOS generations with automatic boot fallback on the physical servers, btrbk/restic, hourly read-only snapshots of the REST store, and documented backup procedures | A rollback does not undo compromised data or secrets; backup configuration alone does not prove restore works; the offsite immutable copy is still planned | diff --git a/docs/security-keys.md b/docs/security-keys.md index 06cb5915..4b45e8fd 100644 --- a/docs/security-keys.md +++ b/docs/security-keys.md @@ -3,17 +3,20 @@ How the CanoKey (or a YubiKey) is set up and used on the desktops: initial setup, adding a backup key, and recovery. Commands here are the single source; the Nix files only point to this page. -Scope: **idols-ai** and **shoukei** (`modules.desktop.canokey.enable`). frieren only shares the -GnuPG `scdaemon` setting. Servers never see a key; they only ask the forwarded agent for sudo. +Scope: **idols-ai** and **shoukei** (`modules.desktop.canokey.enable`). The macOS hosts share only +the GnuPG `scdaemon` setting and commit signing. Servers never see a key; they only ask the +forwarded agent for sudo. ## Principle Management and use happen on different devices. -- **PCs only use the key:** WebAuthn/passkeys, sudo, SSH, LUKS unlock and OpenPGP (pass). +- **PCs only use the key:** WebAuthn/passkeys, sudo, SSH, LUKS unlock and OpenPGP (pass, commit + signing). - **Management happens only in the phone app** (CanoKey Console on iOS/Android): every PIN change, touch policies, application and factory reset, device settings. The CanoKey Admin PIN is never - typed on a PC; the OpenPGP Admin PIN is typed once, for `keytocard`. + typed on a PC; the OpenPGP Admin PIN only while loading a card (`keytocard` and its public key + URL). - Sandboxed browsers see only the FIDO HID interface, never raw USB or CCID, so the WebUSB console is unreachable from them ([hardening](../hardening/README.md)). Unsandboxed software is trusted; if it is malicious, the PC is compromised regardless. @@ -24,6 +27,7 @@ Management and use happen on different devices. | sudo, polkit | [canokey.nix](../modules/nixos/desktop/canokey.nix), registrations in [vars](../vars/default.nix) `canokeyU2fKeys` | password | | sudo via SSH | [ssh-agent-sudo.nix](../modules/nixos/server/ssh-agent-sudo.nix), keys in [vars](../vars/default.nix) `canokeySshKeys` | password | | SSH | [ssh.nix](../home/base/tui/ssh.nix), public keys in [vars](../vars/default.nix) `mainSshAuthorizedKeys` | the other CanoKey; root also accepts the `romantic` recovery key | +| Git signing | [git-signing.nix](../home/base/gui/git-signing.nix) | the other CanoKey; `git commit --no-gpg-sign` | | shoukei LUKS | [hardware-configuration.nix](../hosts/12kingdoms-shoukei/hardware-configuration.nix) `crypttabExtraOpts` | passphrase (prompted after 10 s) | | pass / GPG | [gpg](../home/base/tui/gpg/default.nix) `scdaemonSettings.disable-ccid` | the age-encrypted key backup | @@ -43,37 +47,38 @@ Who decides differs by application: Touch is enforced only over USB; over NFC nothing asks for one (section 1.2). Once section 2 is done: -| Operation | PIN | Touch | Decided by | -| ---------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -| WebAuthn in browsers | FIDO2 PIN, unless the site discourages user verification | every operation | request: the site's `userVerification`; "preferred" asks for the PIN once set | -| sudo, polkit (pam-u2f) | none | every prompt | request: registration `+presence`, no `pinverification` | -| sudo on a server (pam_rssh) | none | every sudo | request: same as SSH | -| SSH login, git over SSH | none; FIDO2 PIN only for `ssh-keygen` creation and `-K` export | every new connection | request: key created without `-O verify-required`; details in [SSH](#ssh) | -| shoukei LUKS | FIDO2 PIN | every boot | request: `systemd-cryptenroll` default | -| OpenPGP decrypt (pass, browserpass) | OpenPGP PIN, once per plug-in | every decryption | key: DEC touch, cache time | -| OpenPGP sign (`pass init`, `gpg --sign`) | OpenPGP PIN, **every signature** | every signature | key: signature PIN, SIG touch, cache time | -| OpenPGP authenticate | OpenPGP PIN, once per plug-in | every use | key: AUT touch, cache time; unused, SSH uses the FIDO2 key | +| Operation | PIN | Touch | Decided by | +| ----------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| WebAuthn in browsers | FIDO2 PIN, unless the site discourages user verification | every operation | request: the site's `userVerification`; "preferred" asks for the PIN once set | +| sudo, polkit (pam-u2f) | none | every prompt | request: registration `+presence`, no `pinverification` | +| sudo on a server (pam_rssh) | none | every sudo | request: same as SSH | +| SSH login, git over SSH | none; FIDO2 PIN only for `ssh-keygen` creation and `-K` export | every new connection | request: key created without `-O verify-required`; details in [SSH](#ssh) | +| shoukei LUKS | FIDO2 PIN | every boot | request: `systemd-cryptenroll` default | +| OpenPGP decrypt (pass, browserpass) | OpenPGP PIN, once per plug-in | cached 30 s | key: DEC touch, cache time | +| OpenPGP sign (git commit, email) | OpenPGP PIN, once per plug-in | cached 30 s | key: signature PIN, SIG touch, cache time | +| OpenPGP authenticate | OpenPGP PIN, once per plug-in | cached 30 s | key: AUT touch, cache time; unused, SSH uses the FIDO2 key | -Little here signs: git commit signing is off, and pass signs only `.gpg-id` on `pass init` (checking -that signature uses the public key, not the card). +The OpenPGP `[S]` subkey signs Git commits ([Commit signing](#commit-signing)), email and `.gpg-id` +on `pass init` (checking that signature uses the public key, not the card). #### OpenPGP settings on the key Stored on the CanoKey, so they follow it to every machine and survive a gpg reinstall; an OpenPGP application reset returns them to the defaults. -| Setting | CanoKey default | Set to | Effect | Change with | -| --------------------- | ---------------------- | ------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -| Signature PIN | forced | forced | forced: PIN for every signature. Not forced: PIN for the first signature after plug-in | `gpg --card-edit` → `admin` → `forcesig` (toggles) | -| Touch for SIG/DEC/AUT | off | on | a touch for every operation with that key, unless cached | `gpg --card-edit` → `admin` → `uif 1 on` (`2` DEC, `3` AUT) | -| Touch cache time | 0 s (no cache) | 0 s | one value for all three keys, 0–255 s: after a touch, operations within that many seconds need none. 0: every operation needs a touch | phone app; gpg has no command for it | -| PIN retries | 3 (PIN, Admin PIN, RC) | 3 | see [1.1](#11-replace-every-default-secret-first) | firmware 3.1.0+ only (1–15), and it resets the PIN and Admin PIN | -| PIN state | — | — | after one PIN entry, decrypt and authenticate need none until the key is unplugged | not configurable | +| Setting | CanoKey default | Set to | Effect | Change with | +| --------------------- | ---------------------- | ---------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Signature PIN | forced | not forced | forced: PIN for every signature. Not forced: PIN for the first signature after plug-in | phone app, or `gpg --card-edit` → `admin` → `forcesig` (toggles) | +| Touch for SIG/DEC/AUT | off | on | a touch for every operation with that key, unless cached | `gpg --card-edit` → `admin` → `uif 1 on` (`2` DEC, `3` AUT) | +| Touch cache time | 0 s (no cache) | 30 s | one value for all three keys, 0–255 s: after a touch, operations within that many seconds need none. 0: every operation needs a touch | phone app; gpg has no command for it | +| PIN retries | 3 (PIN, Admin PIN, RC) | 3 | see [1.1](#11-replace-every-default-secret-first) | firmware 3.1.0+ only (1–15), and it resets the PIN and Admin PIN | +| PIN state | — | — | after one PIN entry, every operation needs none until the key is unplugged (signing only when the signature PIN is not forced) | not configurable | - Use `uif N on`, never `permanent`: a permanent touch policy cannot be turned off again, only cleared by resetting the OpenPGP application. -- A non-zero cache time lets anything holding the gpg-agent socket (browserpass included) decrypt - silently for that window after each touch; 0 keeps one touch per decryption. +- The 30 s cache lets anything holding the gpg-agent socket (browserpass included) sign or decrypt + silently for 30 s after each touch. It buys one touch for a rebase or a burst of pass lookups; the + touch outside that window is what still stops silent use. - Check the key: `gpg --card-status` shows `Signature PIN` and `UIF setting`, but not the cache time. @@ -235,9 +240,10 @@ How it works, and what the prompts mean: - **FIDO2 PIN:** asked only when creating the credential and when exporting it with `-K`, not for each login. Adding `-O verify-required` at creation would require the PIN for every login too. - **Touch:** required for every new connection, including each `git push`/`fetch`. Existing sessions - and reused connections need none: LAN hosts multiplex for 30 minutes (`ControlMaster` in - [ssh.nix](../home/base/tui/ssh.nix)). A deploy that opens one connection per host needs one touch - per host. + and reused connections need none: every host and GitHub multiplex for 30 s after the last session + closes, LAN hosts for 30 minutes (`ControlMaster` in [ssh.nix](../home/base/tui/ssh.nix)). Within + that window any process running as you can open a session over the master without a touch. A + deploy that opens one connection per host needs one touch per host. - **File passphrase:** leave it empty. Reading the file already takes your user session, and software running as you is trusted (see [Principle](#principle)); it could also capture the passphrase the next time you type it. A passphrase would cost one prompt per login, not per @@ -277,18 +283,20 @@ its own GPG passphrase too: it stays protected in the tmpfs keyrings whenever a and age's scrypt covers gpg's weaker S2K against offline guessing. [gpg_canokey.py](../scripts/gpg_canokey.py) does each step in throwaway keyrings on tmpfs. -A new key replaces the old one outright: the old key decrypts the store once, during the switch, and -is then retired. +The key has no scheduled rotation: the subkeys cannot leave the cards, so a new key is made only +when a card is lost or the key may be compromised. A new key replaces the old one outright: the old +key decrypts the store once, during the switch, and is then retired. **Prepare.** Nothing changes for pass yet. -1. Turn on signature and decryption touch on every CanoKey in the phone app; `card` refuses a key - without them. Decryption touch matters most: browserpass gives browsers the GPG agent socket, and - without touch a compromised browser could decrypt the whole store silently after the first PIN. +1. On every CanoKey in the phone app, turn on signature and decryption touch, set the touch cache to + 30 s and the signature PIN to not forced; `card` refuses a key without both touches. Decryption + touch matters most: browserpass gives browsers the GPG agent socket, and without touch a + compromised browser could decrypt the whole store silently after the first PIN. 2. Create the key, with two backup drives mounted: ```bash - python3 scripts/gpg_canokey.py generate --uid ' (pass)
' \ + python3 scripts/gpg_canokey.py generate --uid '
' \ --dest /run/media/$USER/ --dest /run/media/$USER/ \ --public-key ~/codes/nix-secrets/public/.pub ``` @@ -302,12 +310,14 @@ is then retired. 3. Load each CanoKey, with only that key plugged in: `python3 scripts/gpg_canokey.py card --backup /gpg-.tar.age`. It prints the - `gpg --edit-key` commands to type, then signs and decrypts once through the card. `keytocard` is - the only step that types the OpenPGP Admin PIN on a PC; change it again in the phone app - afterwards. + `gpg --edit-key` commands to type, then signs and decrypts once through the card. In the same + sitting, set the public key URL: `gpg --card-edit` → `admin` → `url` → + `https://github.com/ryan4yin.gpg`. These are the only steps that type the OpenPGP Admin PIN on a + PC; change it again in the phone app afterwards. 4. Prepare, but do not deploy, the configuration change: add the public key to `programs.gpg.publicKeys` in [gpg](../home/base/tui/gpg/default.nix), set `PASSWORD_STORE_KEY` to - the `[E]` fingerprint and `PASSWORD_STORE_SIGNING_KEY` to the primary fingerprint (pass checks + the `[E]` fingerprint, and `PASSWORD_STORE_SIGNING_KEY` and `signing.key` in + [git-signing.nix](../home/base/gui/git-signing.nix) to the primary fingerprint (pass checks signatures only against full 40-digit fingerprints). **Switch**, in one sitting: @@ -336,6 +346,54 @@ Until the old key is retired, rolling back is `git -C reset --hard | tar -xOf - revocation.asc | gpg --import`, then publish the public key. +#### Publish the public key + +The key also signs and encrypts email, so its public key is published. Published user IDs carry no +comment: add one per mail address and revoke any that has one, with the primary key in a keyring on +tmpfs (gpg asks for the GPG passphrase): + +```bash +export GNUPGHOME=$(mktemp -d -p "$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR") +age --decrypt | tar -xOf - secret.asc | gpg --import +gpg --import ~/codes/nix-secrets/public/ # user IDs added since the backup +gpg --quick-add-uid '
' +gpg --quick-revoke-uid ' ()
' +gpg --armor --export > ~/codes/nix-secrets/public/ +gpgconf --kill all && rm -rf "$GNUPGHOME" && unset GNUPGHOME +``` + +The backups keep the original user IDs; the public key in nix-secrets is the copy that has the +changes. Push nix-secrets, then run `just upp mysecrets` here. Then publish it: + +1. GitHub: `gh auth refresh -h github.com -s write:gpg_key`, then + `gh gpg-key add ~/codes/nix-secrets/public/`. +2. keys.openpgp.org: upload the file at and confirm every address + from its email. Until then it serves the key without user IDs, which gpg refuses to import. + +A card loaded before its URL was set gets one at its next `card`. A new key repeats these steps; +remove the retired key from GitHub, since the card URL serves every key listed there. Commits it +signed stay Verified: GitHub records verification at push time. + +#### Commit signing + +[git-signing.nix](../home/base/gui/git-signing.nix) signs every commit on the desktops with the +`[S]` subkey, so either CanoKey signs; tags are signed only with `git tag -s`. A rebase or a burst +of commits within 30 s takes one touch. Repositories under `~/work` are not signed: the key carries +no work address. Servers have no card, so commits there stay unsigned. + +GitHub marks a commit Verified once the public key is on the account and has a user ID with the +commit email, verified on the account. + +#### Android (OpenKeychain) + +OpenKeychain imports the public key and keeps stubs that send each operation to the CanoKey over NFC +or USB, like the stubs in `~/.gnupg`: + +1. Manage my keys → Use Security Token, then hold the CanoKey to the phone or plug it in. +2. OpenKeychain fetches the public key from the card's URL. Without one, choose to import the + exported public key file. +3. Each operation asks for the OpenPGP PIN; over NFC no touch is needed (section 1.2). + ## 3. Add a backup key A second CanoKey or a YubiKey works the same way; the module name is CanoKey-specific but nothing in diff --git a/flake.lock b/flake.lock index c39a092a..bea826a1 100644 --- a/flake.lock +++ b/flake.lock @@ -494,10 +494,10 @@ "mysecrets": { "flake": false, "locked": { - "lastModified": 1794376126, - "narHash": "sha256-lDoa+rGdXjwd4czCYy26ye094LMv0eXY4pIpeDcWK7k=", + "lastModified": 1795099807, + "narHash": "sha256-uIQNROEKtFbZGNYPto7Wcv0H+YmcsEisN/gUGUsOikA=", "ref": "refs/heads/main", - "rev": "6ab2a713e5938e1bb8ef2d33acab632ba0bd5331", + "rev": "eba74369427e98b0246f6f0f35e80ddcc6808995", "shallow": true, "type": "git", "url": "ssh://git@github.com/ryan4yin/nix-secrets.git" diff --git a/home/base/README.md b/home/base/README.md index b2165221..77a68523 100644 --- a/home/base/README.md +++ b/home/base/README.md @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ systems. - **gui/**: Cross-platform GUI applications and configurations - **dev-tools.nix**: Misc development and network tools (mitmproxy, wireshark) + - **git-signing.nix**: Git commit signing with the OpenPGP key on the CanoKeys - **media.nix**: Media players and utilities - **zed-editor.nix**: Zed editor configuration (primary GUI editor) - **rime/**: Rime (flypy) customisation shared by fcitx5-rime (Linux) and Squirrel (macOS) diff --git a/home/base/gui/git-signing.nix b/home/base/gui/git-signing.nix new file mode 100644 index 00000000..59a91c60 --- /dev/null +++ b/home/base/gui/git-signing.nix @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +{ + # Sign commits with the OpenPGP [S] subkey that both CanoKeys hold; the card's + # touch cache covers a burst of commits. Desktop layer only, where the cards + # are used; setup: docs/security-keys.md#commit-signing. + programs.git = { + signing.key = "BB8DFBAC2E9BE8F15649E3AA1F2440D500288E48"; # primary; gpg picks its [S] subkey + # Not signByDefault: its tag.gpgSign turns every lightweight `git tag` into an annotated one. + settings.commit.gpgSign = true; + # The personal key carries no work address, so work commits stay unsigned. + includes = [ + { + condition = "gitdir:~/work/"; + contents.commit.gpgSign = false; + } + ]; + }; +} diff --git a/home/base/tui/gpg/README.md b/home/base/tui/gpg/README.md index e867ca40..12ed2333 100644 --- a/home/base/tui/gpg/README.md +++ b/home/base/tui/gpg/README.md @@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ tool that is simple enough, functional enough, and widely adopted. Currently I use both age & GnuPG: 1. Age for secrets encryption, it's simple and easy to use. -2. GnuPG for password-store, because pass, browserpass and Android Password Store all speak OpenPGP. +2. GnuPG for password-store, because pass, browserpass and Android Password Store all speak OpenPGP, + and for Git commit signing and signed or encrypted email. SSH no longer goes through GnuPG: each CanoKey holds a FIDO2 SSH key instead (no `[A]` subkey). @@ -44,7 +45,8 @@ SSH no longer goes through GnuPG: each CanoKey holds a FIDO2 SSH key instead (no backup is opened, and age's scrypt covers gpg's weak S2K (see section 0) against offline guessing. - [`scripts/gpg_canokey.py`](../../../../scripts/gpg_canokey.py) generates the key, switches the password store to it and loads the cards, all in throwaway keyrings on tmpfs. The procedure is in - [hardware security keys](../../../../docs/security-keys.md#pass-openpgp). + [hardware security keys](../../../../docs/security-keys.md#pass-openpgp), with publishing the + public key and using the cards from OpenKeychain on Android. The sections below explain the GnuPG concepts behind that setup. @@ -290,7 +292,8 @@ But in OpenPGP: embarrassing. - Anyone can upload a key to the key server, and claim that it is the key of a certain person(such as Linus), which is very insecure. - - **key server** is not recommend to use. + - **key server** is not recommend to use. keys.openpgp.org is the exception: it publishes a user + ID only after mailing that address, and lets the owner remove it. - GnuPG will generate revocation certificate when generating keypair(`~/.gnupg/openpgp-revocs.d/.rev`), anyone can import this certificate to revoke the keypair. But OpenPGP standard **DO NOT provide a way to distribute this certificate to diff --git a/home/base/tui/password-store/README.md b/home/base/tui/password-store/README.md index 9974c877..9dfe583c 100644 --- a/home/base/tui/password-store/README.md +++ b/home/base/tui/password-store/README.md @@ -9,9 +9,10 @@ ## Changing the GPG key -Change the key every two or three years. `python3 scripts/gpg_canokey.py pass` switches the store: -it decrypts every entry with the old key before changing anything, runs `pass init`, then checks -that each entry opens with the new key alone and kept its content. The whole procedure, from +Change the key only when a CanoKey is lost or the key may be compromised; its subkeys never leave +the cards, so there is no scheduled rotation. `python3 scripts/gpg_canokey.py pass` switches the +store: it decrypts every entry with the old key before changing anything, runs `pass init`, then +checks that each entry opens with the new key alone and kept its content. The whole procedure, from generating the key to retiring the old one, is in [hardware security keys](../../../../docs/security-keys.md#pass-openpgp). diff --git a/home/base/tui/ssh.nix b/home/base/tui/ssh.nix index 08c58113..bf7f6496 100644 --- a/home/base/tui/ssh.nix +++ b/home/base/tui/ssh.nix @@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ in home.file.".ssh/romantic.pub".source = "${mysecrets}/public/romantic.pub"; # Each CanoKey holds a resident FIDO2 SSH key for GitHub and every host, its - # handle exported on each desktop to ~/.ssh/canokey-; every use needs a - # touch, and ssh skips the handle of an unplugged key. Setup: + # handle exported on each desktop to ~/.ssh/canokey-; every new + # connection needs a touch, and ssh skips the handle of an unplugged key. Setup: # docs/security-keys.md. programs.ssh = { enable = true; @@ -53,9 +53,10 @@ in ServerAliveCountMax = 3; HashKnownHosts = false; UserKnownHostsFile = "~/.ssh/known_hosts"; - ControlMaster = "no"; + # A connection reused within 30 s needs no new touch. + ControlMaster = "auto"; ControlPath = "~/.ssh/master-%r@%n:%p"; - ControlPersist = "no"; + ControlPersist = "30s"; }; "github.com" = { diff --git a/scripts/gpg_canokey.py b/scripts/gpg_canokey.py index 758125d5..9b6d6e12 100755 --- a/scripts/gpg_canokey.py +++ b/scripts/gpg_canokey.py @@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ def build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser: return command generate = add("generate", cmd_generate, "create the key and its backup") - generate.add_argument("--uid", required=True, help="such as 'Name (pass)
'") + generate.add_argument("--uid", required=True, help="such as 'Name
'") generate.add_argument( "--dest", action="append", required=True, help="directory for one backup copy; repeat it" )