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ryan4yin | 二花
707da35996
* fix(nixpak): stop exposing the system D-Bus to apps * fix(nixpak): bind only the PulseAudio socket * feat(nixpak): run apps in a new session tied to the launcher * feat(nixpak): start apps from an allowlisted environment * feat(nixpak): isolate app networking with pasta * fix(nixpak): keep Firefox on the host network Assisted-by: Claude Code (claude-opus-5-5)
Linux Hardening
Work in progress.
Application sandboxing (nixpak/bubblewrap) and Linux hardening knowledge for this repository. For
the repository security policy, architecture and audit status, see SECURITY.md;
for temporary exceptions and known gaps, see WORKAROUNDS.md.
Goal
- System Level: Protect critical files from being accessed by untrusted applications.
- Such as browser cookies, SSH keys, etc.
- Per-App Level: Prevent untrusted applications(such as closed-source apps) from:
- Accessing files they shouldn't.
- Such as a malicious application accessing your browser's cookies, SSH keys, etc.
- Accessing the network when they don't need to.
- Accessing hardware devices they don't need.
- Accessing files they shouldn't.
Current Structure
1. System Level
- AppArmor (
apparmor/): AppArmor profiles and configuration - Kernel & process hardening (
kernel-hardening.nix): sysctl baseline and unused-module deny list; rationale and verification live inSECURITY.md.
2. Per-App Level
- Nixpak (
nixpaks/): Bubblewrap-based sandboxing for applications- Firefox configuration
- QQ (Chinese messaging app) configuration
- Telegram Desktop configuration
- Modular system with reusable components
- Bubblewrap (
bwraps/): Direct bubblewrap configurations- WeChat sandboxing configuration
Current Implementation Status
| Component | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| AppArmor Profiles | 🚧 WIP | Basic structure in place |
| Nixpak Firefox | ✅ Active | Firefox sandboxing via nixpak |
| Nixpak QQ | ✅ Active | QQ application sandboxing |
| Nixpak Telegram | ✅ Active | Telegram Desktop sandboxing |
| Bubblewrap WeChat | ✅ Active | WeChat specific sandboxing |
Directory Structure
hardening/
├── README.md
├── kernel-hardening.nix # sysctl baseline + unused-module deny list
├── apparmor/ # AppArmor security profiles
│ └── default.nix
├── bwraps/ # Direct bubblewrap configurations
│ ├── default.nix
│ └── wechat.nix
└── nixpaks/ # Nixpak application sandboxing
├── default.nix
├── firefox.nix
├── qq.nix
├── telegram-desktop.nix
└── modules/ # Reusable nixpak modules
├── custom-policy.nix
├── gui-base.nix
└── network.nix
System Hardening
- Apparmor: roddhjav/apparmor.d
- https://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor/-/wikis/Documentation
- AppArmor.d is a set of over 1500 AppArmor profiles whose aim is to confine most Linux based applications and processes.
- But its profiles assume an FHS filesystem, so most of them never match the Nix store paths a NixOS system actually executes.
- Apparmor on NixOS Roadmap:
- SELinux: too complex, not recommended for personal use.
Application Sandboxing
- Bubblewrap:
nixpak, more secure than firejail, but no batteries included.
- NixOS's FHSEnv is implemented using bubblewrap by default.
- Firejail: A SUID security sandbox with
hundreds of security profiles for many common applications in the default installation.
- https://wiki.nixos.org/wiki/Firejail
- Firejail needs SUID to work, which is considered a security risk - Does firejail improve the security of my system?
- Systemd/Hardening: Systemd also provides some sandboxing features.
NOTE
Running untrusted code is never safe, kernel hardening & sandboxing cannot change this; run
untrusted code in a VM on an isolated network. The threat model lives in
SECURITY.md.
References
- Harden your NixOS workstation - dataswamp
- Linux Insecurities - Madaidans
- Sandboxing all programs by default - NixOS Discourse
- Paranoid NixOS Setup - xeiaso
- nix-mineral: NixOS module for convenient system hardening.
- apparmor configs: