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ryan4yin | 二花
e5b95affa6
Hosts used to trust the router as the only boundary (servers ran with the firewall off; service ports were opened globally), so any LAN device could reach every host service. Move filtering to the hosts as defence in depth behind the router, which keeps its firewall on and uses a port mapping for the few ports we actually need. - base: nftables backend; deny inbound by default; trust the home LAN by source and the tailnet by interface (restrict the tailnet with ACLs); suppress per-service `openFirewall` global ports; allow node_exporter only from the monitoring host. The local podman bridge, the tailnet and the pod CIDRs are accepted only after the node_exporter drop. - servers: stop disabling the firewall; drop redundant global port opens (caddy 80/443, NFS 2049, Jellyfin, localsend/test ports); delete the redundant desktop firewall module; aarch64/riscv64 import the firewall explicitly (akane was missing it). - k3s: Cilium pods (10.0.0.0/8, fd00::/8) may reach host services; drop the flannel-era cni0/flannel.1 trust. - youko: postgres listens on localhost + the LAN with pg_hba limited to the LAN; the NFS export stays LAN-scoped; remove the unauthenticated v2ray proxy. - tests: `security-firewall` asserts every host runs the shared firewall, has the LAN CIDR rule and no global ports.