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feat(canokey): enroll new CanoKeys and retire per-host SSH keys (#524)
Hosts now accept only the two CanoKeys' resident SSH keys for ryan, plus the romantic recovery key for root; per-host user keys stop working. Darwin builds work again: the shared base no longer sets nixpkgs.config next to nix-darwin's nixpkgs.pkgs. Assisted-by: DeepSeek Harness (claude-opus-5-5) Assisted-by: DeepSeek Harness (deepseek-flash)
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@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ small, reversible controls and narrow exceptions; benchmark before adopting expe
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## Architecture and trust boundaries
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| Boundary | Current design | Limitation |
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| --------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
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| --------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
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| Administration | Key-based SSH; root key login retained for Colmena/MicroVM deployment; only keys declared in Nix are honoured, and no password or keyboard-interactive login; remote-builder host keys only reach `nix-daemon` | Deployment credentials are root-equivalent file keys, usable by any same-user process through the desktop SSH agent; one stolen key reaches every host |
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| Host network | Shared nftables firewall trusts the home LAN, tailnet interface and local Podman bridge; IPv6 link-local is accepted | These are broad trust zones, not service-level least privilege; router exposure and tailnet ACLs require separate verification |
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| Monitoring | node/smartctl exporters bind the host LAN IPv4 (9100/9633); firewall rules restrict exporter ports 9100, 9835 and 9633 to the monitoring host over IPv4. RAPL counters are exposed only on x86 server hosts, to `node-exporter` through the `rapl` group. | nvidia_gpu_exporter (9835) still binds wildcard; the IPv6 denial for those three ports is in the shared firewall; current running hosts require separate verification. The node_exporter account can measure package energy for local side channels; interactive users, desktops, and guests keep the kernel-default root-only permission. |
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@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ small, reversible controls and narrow exceptions; benchmark before adopting expe
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| k3s | Three control-plane and three worker MicroVMs; Cilium, API VIP and NFS CSI | Cluster-admin, privileged/host-mounted pods and writable NFS data are powerful trust boundaries |
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| MicroVM storage | Host store shared read-only through virtiofs; guest `/etc`, `/var` and `/home` persisted in separate images | Read-only store does not isolate the host-side virtiofs implementation or protect writable guest state |
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| Desktop apps | Selected apps use nixpak/bubblewrap; Podman is rootless | Rules and shared directories vary per app; user namespaces are needed for these sandboxes |
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| Security keys | idols-ai/shoukei use a CanoKey for touch-based sudo (pam_u2f, password fallback; servers via pam_rssh and the forwarded agent), one resident `ed25519-sk` SSH key for GitHub and all hosts, FIDO2 LUKS unlock on shoukei and on-card OpenPGP subkeys; key management happens only in the phone app ([setup](./security-keys.md)) | Touch-only sudo can be triggered by any same-user process, and on a server by root through the forwarded agent; per-host file SSH keys and passphrases stay valid as fallback, so their weaknesses remain until retired |
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| Security keys | idols-ai/shoukei use a CanoKey for touch-based sudo (pam_u2f, password fallback; servers via pam_rssh and the forwarded agent), a resident `ed25519-sk` SSH key per CanoKey as the only user SSH keys for GitHub and all hosts, FIDO2 LUKS unlock on shoukei and on-card OpenPGP subkeys; key management happens only in the phone app ([setup](./security-keys.md)) | Touch-only sudo can be triggered by any same-user process, and on a server by root through the forwarded agent; losing both CanoKeys leaves only root logins with the `romantic` recovery key |
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| Secrets | agenix declarations here, encrypted data in the private nix-secrets repository | Recipients and plaintext file permissions must be reviewed; root on a recipient can read its decrypted secrets |
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| Supply chain | Locked flake inputs; explicit binary-cache trust keys on NixOS; normal user is not a Nix trusted-user | A trusted cache or imported Nix module can supply code executed as root; a lock file is not a security audit |
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| Recovery | NixOS generations, btrbk/restic, hourly read-only snapshots of the REST store, and documented backup procedures | A rollback does not undo compromised data or secrets; backup configuration alone does not prove restore works; the offsite immutable copy is still planned |
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+129
-74
@@ -18,18 +18,65 @@ Management and use happen on different devices.
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is unreachable from them ([hardening](../hardening/README.md)). Unsandboxed software is trusted;
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if it is malicious, the PC is compromised regardless.
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| Use | Config | Daily use | Fallback without the key |
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| ------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------- |
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| Browsers | [nixpak FIDO2 passthrough](../hardening/nixpaks/default.nix) | FIDO2 PIN and/or touch, as the site asks | site recovery codes, other registered key |
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| sudo, polkit | [canokey.nix](../modules/nixos/desktop/canokey.nix), registrations in [vars](../vars/default.nix) `canokeyU2fKeys` | touch | password |
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| sudo via SSH | [ssh-agent-sudo.nix](../modules/nixos/server/ssh-agent-sudo.nix), keys in [vars](../vars/default.nix) `canokeySshKeys` | touch | password |
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| SSH | [ssh.nix](../home/base/tui/ssh.nix), public keys in [vars](../vars/default.nix) `mainSshAuthorizedKeys` | touch per connection | per-host file keys |
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| shoukei LUKS | [hardware-configuration.nix](../hosts/12kingdoms-shoukei/hardware-configuration.nix) `crypttabExtraOpts` | FIDO2 PIN + touch | passphrase (prompted after 10 s) |
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| pass / GPG | [gpg](../home/base/tui/gpg/default.nix) `scdaemonSettings.disable-ccid` | OpenPGP PIN once per plug-in, then touch | off-card subkey backup |
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| Use | Config | Fallback without the key |
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| ------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| Browsers | [nixpak FIDO2 passthrough](../hardening/nixpaks/default.nix) | site recovery codes, other registered key |
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| sudo, polkit | [canokey.nix](../modules/nixos/desktop/canokey.nix), registrations in [vars](../vars/default.nix) `canokeyU2fKeys` | password |
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| sudo via SSH | [ssh-agent-sudo.nix](../modules/nixos/server/ssh-agent-sudo.nix), keys in [vars](../vars/default.nix) `canokeySshKeys` | password |
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| SSH | [ssh.nix](../home/base/tui/ssh.nix), public keys in [vars](../vars/default.nix) `mainSshAuthorizedKeys` | the other CanoKey; root also accepts the `romantic` recovery key |
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| shoukei LUKS | [hardware-configuration.nix](../hosts/12kingdoms-shoukei/hardware-configuration.nix) `crypttabExtraOpts` | passphrase (prompted after 10 s) |
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| pass / GPG | [gpg](../home/base/tui/gpg/default.nix) `scdaemonSettings.disable-ccid` | off-card subkey backup |
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Only sudo and polkit accept a touch. Login (greetd), the lock screen and every other PAM service
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stay password-based: the login password also unlocks GNOME Keyring.
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### PIN and touch per operation
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Who decides differs by application:
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- **FIDO2** (WebAuthn, sudo, SSH, LUKS): the key stores no touch or PIN policy. Each request says
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whether it needs a touch (user presence) and the FIDO2 PIN (user verification); the key only
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enforces what was asked. The one on-key factor is that a FIDO2 PIN is set.
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- **OpenPGP** (pass, GPG): the key enforces its own policies, whatever gpg asks for; see
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[OpenPGP settings on the key](#openpgp-settings-on-the-key).
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Touch is enforced only over USB; over NFC nothing asks for one (section 1.2). Once section 2 is
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done:
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| Operation | PIN | Touch | Decided by |
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| ---------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| WebAuthn in browsers | FIDO2 PIN, unless the site discourages user verification | every operation | request: the site's `userVerification`; "preferred" asks for the PIN once set |
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| sudo, polkit (pam-u2f) | none | every prompt | request: registration `+presence`, no `pinverification` |
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| sudo on a server (pam_rssh) | none | every sudo | request: same as SSH |
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| SSH login, git over SSH | none; FIDO2 PIN only for `ssh-keygen` creation and `-K` export | every new connection | request: key created without `-O verify-required`; details in [SSH](#ssh) |
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| shoukei LUKS | FIDO2 PIN | every boot | request: `systemd-cryptenroll` default |
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| OpenPGP decrypt (pass, browserpass) | OpenPGP PIN, once per plug-in | every decryption | key: DEC touch, cache time |
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| OpenPGP sign (`pass init`, `gpg --sign`) | OpenPGP PIN, **every signature** | every signature | key: signature PIN, SIG touch, cache time |
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| OpenPGP authenticate | OpenPGP PIN, once per plug-in | every use | key: AUT touch, cache time; unused, SSH uses the FIDO2 key |
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Little here signs: git commit signing is off, and pass signs only `.gpg-id` on `pass init` (checking
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that signature uses the public key, not the card).
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#### OpenPGP settings on the key
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Stored on the CanoKey, so they follow it to every machine and survive a gpg reinstall; an OpenPGP
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application reset returns them to the defaults.
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| Setting | CanoKey default | Set to | Effect | Change with |
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| --------------------- | ---------------------- | ------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| Signature PIN | forced | forced | forced: PIN for every signature. Not forced: PIN for the first signature after plug-in | `gpg --card-edit` → `admin` → `forcesig` (toggles) |
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| Touch for SIG/DEC/AUT | off | on | a touch for every operation with that key, unless cached | `gpg --card-edit` → `admin` → `uif 1 on` (`2` DEC, `3` AUT) |
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| Touch cache time | 0 s (no cache) | 0 s | one value for all three keys, 0–255 s: after a touch, operations within that many seconds need none. 0: every operation needs a touch | phone app; gpg has no command for it |
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| PIN retries | 3 (PIN, Admin PIN, RC) | 3 | see [1.1](#11-replace-every-default-secret-first) | firmware 3.1.0+ only (1–15), and it resets the PIN and Admin PIN |
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| PIN state | — | — | after one PIN entry, decrypt and authenticate need none until the key is unplugged | not configurable |
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- Use `uif N on`, never `permanent`: a permanent touch policy cannot be turned off again, only
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cleared by resetting the OpenPGP application.
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- A non-zero cache time lets anything holding the gpg-agent socket (browserpass included) decrypt
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silently for that window after each touch; 0 keeps one touch per decryption.
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- Check the key: `gpg --card-status` shows `Signature PIN` and `UIF setting`, but not the cache
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time.
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## 1. Device setup
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### 1.1 Replace every default secret first
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@@ -41,20 +88,21 @@ firmware), and blocking one does not affect the others. The defaults are public
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a default PIN or management key, anyone holding the key can use or rewrite that application.
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| Application | Secret | Default | Protects | Set it to | Typed |
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| ----------- | ----------------- | ---------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
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| Device | CanoKey Admin PIN | `123456` | settings, per-application and factory reset | random, 12+ characters (6–64); save offline | phone only |
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| WebAuthn | FIDO2 PIN | unset | passkeys, LUKS unlock, SSH key creation and export | memorable, 8+ characters (4–63); memorize | daily, browsers |
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| OpenPGP | PIN | `123456` | decrypt (pass), sign, authenticate | memorable, 8+ characters (6–64), not the FIDO2 PIN; memorize | daily, pinentry |
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| OpenPGP | Admin PIN | `12345678` | key import (`keytocard`), touch policy, unblocking the PIN | random, 12+ characters (8–64); save offline | setup only |
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| ----------- | --------------------- | ---------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
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| Device | **CanoKey Admin PIN** | `123456` | settings, per-application and factory reset | random, 8+ characters (6–64); save offline | phone only |
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| WebAuthn | **FIDO2 PIN** | unset | passkeys, LUKS unlock, SSH key creation and export | memorable, 6+ characters (4–63); memorize | daily, browsers |
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| OpenPGP | **PIN** | `123456` | decrypt (pass), sign, authenticate | memorable, 6+ characters (6–64), not the FIDO2 PIN; memorize | daily, pinentry |
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| OpenPGP | **Admin PIN** | `12345678` | key import (`keytocard`), touch policy, unblocking the PIN | random, 8+ characters (8–64); save offline | setup only |
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| OpenPGP | Reset Code | unset | unblocking the PIN without the Admin PIN | leave unset (the Admin PIN also unblocks), or random and save offline | recovery only |
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| PIV | PIN / PUK | `123456` / `12345678` | PIV keys / unblocking the PIV PIN | 8 random digits each (maximum 8); do not save | never |
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| PIV | management key | `0102030405060708` × 3 | writing PIV keys and certificates | the app's random management key button; do not save | never |
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| OATH | none: no password | — | anyone holding the key can read its TOTP/HOTP codes | — | — |
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Every PIN locks after 3 wrong attempts, so length matters less than not reusing a value. Generate
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the random values with the phone's password manager; "save offline" means that password manager or
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paper, never `pass`: `pass` itself is decrypted by this key. The FIDO2 PIN is typed into browsers,
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the least trusted place, so it must not also unlock pass.
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- **Every PIN locks after 3 wrong attempts, so length matters less than not reusing a value.
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- Generate the random values with the phone's password manager;
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- "save offline" means that password manager or paper, never `pass`: `pass` itself is decrypted by
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this key.
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- The FIDO2 PIN is typed into browsers, the least trusted place, so it must not also unlock pass.
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PIV is unused, so its secrets are random and discarded: PIV is then locked rather than open with
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public defaults. To use PIV later, reset just the PIV application in the phone app (needs only the
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@@ -65,26 +113,18 @@ CanoKey Admin PIN), which restores the defaults.
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Touch policies are enforced **only over USB, not NFC**. OpenPGP and PIV stay reachable over NFC on
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released firmware, but each NFC tap is a new card session, so their PINs are still required.
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1. Check the firmware version. U2F (sudo) does not work on 3.0.0; 3.0.2 and later are fine. The
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newest public release is canokey-core [3.0.3](https://github.com/canokeys/canokey-core/tags).
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2. Settings on released firmware (the user guide lists LED, NDEF and WebUSB login page):
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Firmware must be 3.0.2 or later. Settings marked 3.1.0+ appear only on that firmware:
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| Setting | Choice | Why |
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| ----------------- | -------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| ---------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| LED | on | an unexpected blink means something requested a touch |
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| WebUSB login page | off | the console is not used on PCs |
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| NDEF | off, or read-only if the app offers it | default is enabled; anyone nearby can read it, and rewrite it if writable |
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3. The user guide also documents options for **firmware 3.1.0**, which has no public release yet
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(only the docs mention it; canokey-core's `dev` branch is unversioned). If the app shows them:
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| Option | Choice | Why |
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| ------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------ |
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| OpenPGP / PIV over NFC | off, unless the phone needs OpenPGP | touch is not enforced over NFC |
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| Password/HOTP keyboard output, PIV switches | off unless used | smaller attack surface |
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| WebAuthn `alwaysUv` | off | on breaks U2F, which sudo uses |
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| WebAuthn minimum PIN length | 6–8 | the PIN locks after a few failures |
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| Long-press reset | off, unless the app documents it as PIN-gated | keeps reset a phone-side management action |
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| NDEF | read-only | default is enabled; anyone nearby can read it, and rewrite it if writable |
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| OpenPGP / PIV over NFC (3.1.0+) | off, unless the phone needs OpenPGP | touch is not enforced over NFC |
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| Password/HOTP keyboard output, PIV switches (3.1.0+) | off unless used | smaller attack surface |
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| WebAuthn `alwaysUv` (3.1.0+) | off | on breaks U2F, which sudo uses |
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| WebAuthn minimum PIN length (3.1.0+) | 6–8 | the PIN locks after a few failures |
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| Long-press reset (3.1.0+) | off, unless the app documents it as PIN-gated | keeps reset a phone-side management action |
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### 1.3 Touch feedback
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@@ -158,23 +198,38 @@ needs a touch, so an unexpected blink is the signal to refuse it.
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### SSH
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One SSH key, used for GitHub and every host, lives on the key as a resident credential:
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One SSH key per CanoKey, used for GitHub and every host, lives on it as a resident credential.
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`<name>` is the key's name (`tea` is the main key, `moe` the backup):
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```bash
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ssh-keygen -t ed25519-sk -O resident -O application=ssh:ryan4yin -C ryan@canokey-<name>
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ssh-keygen -t ed25519-sk -O resident -O application=ssh:ryan4yin-<name> -C ryan@canokey-<name> \
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-f ~/.ssh/canokey-<name>
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```
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This writes `~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk` on the machine that runs it. On each other desktop, export the
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key handle to ssh's default identity:
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On each other desktop, export the handle of every key, one key plugged in at a time:
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```bash
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cd ~/.ssh && ssh-keygen -K \
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&& mv id_ed25519_sk_rk_ryan4yin id_ed25519_sk && mv id_ed25519_sk_rk_ryan4yin.pub id_ed25519_sk.pub
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&& mv id_ed25519_sk_rk_ryan4yin-<name> canokey-<name> \
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&& mv id_ed25519_sk_rk_ryan4yin-<name>.pub canokey-<name>.pub
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```
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[ssh.nix](../home/base/tui/ssh.nix) lists `~/.ssh/canokey-tea`, then `~/.ssh/canokey-moe`, as the
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identities for every host and GitHub. Whichever key is plugged in answers; ssh skips the handle of
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an absent key.
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What the CanoKey stores, and so what the phone app lists, is fixed by OpenSSH
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([sk-usbhid.c](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/master/sk-usbhid.c)):
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- **RP ID** = `-O application`, the only label you choose. It must start with `ssh:`
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(`ssh-keygen -K` loads only those), and CanoKey keeps at most 32 bytes of it. Naming it per key
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keeps the exported files of two keys apart.
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- **User name and display name** are always `openssh`; no ssh-keygen option changes them.
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- The `-C` comment is **not** stored on the key, only in the `.pub` and handle files.
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How it works, and what the prompts mean:
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- The private key never leaves the CanoKey. `~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk` holds only the credential ID,
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- The private key never leaves the CanoKey. `~/.ssh/canokey-<name>` holds only the credential ID,
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application and public key. Every authentication sends the server's challenge to the key, which
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signs it after a touch; with the key unplugged, ssh skips this identity and tries the next one.
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- **FIDO2 PIN:** asked only when creating the credential and when exporting it with `-K`, not for
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@@ -190,9 +245,8 @@ How it works, and what the prompts mean:
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for each signature.
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Add the public key to `canokeySshKeys` in [vars/default.nix](../vars/default.nix), which is part of
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`mainSshAuthorizedKeys`, and to GitHub. GitHub tries `id_ed25519_sk` before the per-host key; other
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hosts try it as a default identity. Keys already loaded in `ssh-agent` are offered first, so the
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per-host keys can still win until they are retired.
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`mainSshAuthorizedKeys`, and to GitHub. These are the only user keys: without a CanoKey, only root
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logins with the `romantic` recovery key (`secondaryAuthorizedKeys`) remain.
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### shoukei LUKS
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@@ -209,27 +263,41 @@ also finds the key's FIDO applet through pcscd (`pcsc://slot0`) and `auto` stops
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FIDO device found". Unlocking at boot is unaffected: pcscd does not run in the initrd.
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The default enrollment requires the FIDO2 PIN and a touch; keep it that way, since the key often
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travels with the laptop. The passphrase slot stays. Reboot to verify.
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travels with the laptop. The passphrase slot stays. Reboot to verify. A reset key leaves a dead slot
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behind; remove every FIDO2 slot with `--wipe-slot=fido2` (the passphrase slot stays), then enroll
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each key again.
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### pass (OpenPGP)
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The password store is encrypted to the `[E]` subkey `0xEF824EB73CFD6CC7`; the primary key is
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offline.
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offline. The off-card backup of the three subkeys is the agenix secret
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`/etc/agenix/ryan4yin-gpg-subkeys.priv.age` on the desktops: root-only, and still age-encrypted with
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a passphrase. Write the subkeys onto each key from a throwaway `GNUPGHOME`, so the daily keyring
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only ever holds stubs. With only that key plugged in:
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1. Verify the **off-card backup** of all three subkeys first: `keytocard` replaces the on-disk copy
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with a stub.
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2. Move the subkeys: `gpg --edit-key 0xCC88591C033F1924`, then `key 1` → `keytocard` (encryption),
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and likewise for the signing and authentication subkeys; `save`.
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3. Require touch for SIG, DEC and AUT in the phone app's OpenPGP page (or on the PC:
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`gpg --card-edit` → `admin` → `uif 1 on`, `uif 2 on`, `uif 3 on`). Decrypt touch matters most:
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browserpass gives browsers the GPG agent socket, and without touch a compromised browser could
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decrypt the whole store silently after the first PIN.
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4. On other machines that still hold on-disk copies, delete them
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(`gpg --delete-secret-keys '<subkey-fingerprint>!'`) and run `gpg --card-status` so gpg records
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stubs for the card.
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```bash
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export GNUPGHOME=$(mktemp -d)
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echo disable-ccid > "$GNUPGHOME/scdaemon.conf" # reach the key through pcscd, as the daily config does
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sudo cat /etc/agenix/ryan4yin-gpg-subkeys.priv.age | age --decrypt | gpg --import
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gpg --card-status # shows this key's serial
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gpg --edit-key 0xCC88591C033F1924
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```
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|
||||
`keytocard` is the only step that types the OpenPGP Admin PIN on a PC; change it again in the phone
|
||||
app afterwards.
|
||||
1. In `gpg --edit-key`, for each subkey: `key N` (the `[S]`, `[E]` or `[A]` one), `keytocard`, pick
|
||||
the slot of the same usage, `key N` again to deselect; then `save`. This asks for the subkey
|
||||
passphrase and the OpenPGP Admin PIN.
|
||||
2. Require touch: `gpg --card-edit` → `admin` → `uif 1 on`, `uif 2 on`, `uif 3 on` (or the phone
|
||||
app). Decrypt touch matters most: browserpass gives browsers the GPG agent socket, and without
|
||||
touch a compromised browser could decrypt the whole store silently after the first PIN.
|
||||
3. Drop the throwaway keyring: `gpgconf --kill all && rm -rf "$GNUPGHOME" && unset GNUPGHOME`.
|
||||
4. In the daily keyring, point the stubs at the plugged-in key:
|
||||
`gpg-connect-agent "scd serialno" "learn --force" /bye`. Check with `pass show <entry>` (PIN,
|
||||
then touch). On a machine that still holds on-disk subkeys, delete them first
|
||||
(`gpg --delete-secret-keys '<subkey-fingerprint>!'`).
|
||||
|
||||
For the next key, start again from `export GNUPGHOME=…`: `save` turned the throwaway copies into
|
||||
stubs. `keytocard` is the only step that types the OpenPGP Admin PIN on a PC; change it again in the
|
||||
phone app afterwards.
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. Add a backup key
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -238,13 +306,13 @@ it is. On a YubiKey, manage settings with Yubico Authenticator or `ykman`; OpenP
|
||||
`ykman openpgp keys set-touch dec on` (and `sig`, `aut`).
|
||||
|
||||
| Use | Backup key step |
|
||||
| ------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| ------------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| Device | Section 1 again |
|
||||
| Browsers | Register it on every site as an additional security key |
|
||||
| sudo | `pamu2fcfg --nouser --origin=pam://ryan4yin` with only the backup plugged in; append to `canokeyU2fKeys` |
|
||||
| SSH | Create a resident key on it with the same command; add its public key to `canokeySshKeys` and GitHub. Use it with `ssh-add -K` (loads resident keys into the agent) instead of exporting a file |
|
||||
| shoukei LUKS | Run the same `systemd-cryptenroll --fido2-device=auto` with only the backup plugged in; it takes the next slot |
|
||||
| OpenPGP | Import the subkeys from the backup into a fresh, temporary `GNUPGHOME`, `keytocard` them onto the backup key, then delete that `GNUPGHOME`. The stubs remember the card serial; after swapping cards run `gpg-connect-agent "scd serialno" "learn --force" /bye` |
|
||||
| SSH | Create a resident key on it with the same command and its own `<name>`; add its public key to `canokeySshKeys` and GitHub, and its handle file to the `IdentityFile` lists |
|
||||
| shoukei LUKS | Run the same `systemd-cryptenroll --fido2-device=/dev/hidrawN` with only the backup plugged in; it takes the next slot |
|
||||
| OpenPGP | The same throwaway-`GNUPGHOME` procedure. The stubs remember the card serial; after swapping cards run `gpg-connect-agent "scd serialno" "learn --force" /bye` |
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Lost key or reset
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -258,19 +326,6 @@ it is. On a YubiKey, manage settings with Yubico Authenticator or `ykman`; OpenP
|
||||
|
||||
After any reset, rerun sections 1 and 2 for the affected applications.
|
||||
|
||||
## Enrollment status
|
||||
|
||||
| Key | Firmware | sudo | SSH | shoukei LUKS | OpenPGP | Browsers |
|
||||
| -------------------------------------- | -------- | ----------------- | ------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------- | ----------- | -------------------------------- |
|
||||
| CanoKey Canary (backup, `canokey-moe`) | 3.0.3 | works on idols-ai | public key in `canokeySshKeys`; host login not verified | enrolled; unlock not verified | on the card | WebAuthn works in Firefox/Chrome |
|
||||
|
||||
shoukei's first boots with the FIDO2 slot asked for the PIN, then fell back to the passphrase: USB
|
||||
only came up after switch-root, because on linux-asahi 7.2 its dwc3/PHY depend on the Thunderbolt
|
||||
(ACIO) nodes, whose `thunderbolt_apple` and `reset_apple_cio` drivers were missing from the initrd.
|
||||
nixos-apple-silicon added both upstream (`275e570ea8`), and the input now includes it; unlocking
|
||||
with the key is not yet verified. Also not verified: the CanoKey Admin PIN retry count, and how
|
||||
touch is performed when resetting over NFC.
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
|
||||
- [CanoKey user guide](https://docs.canokeys.org/userguide/): settings, WebAuthn, OpenPGP, PIV
|
||||
|
||||
+11
-4
@@ -26,12 +26,14 @@ in
|
||||
{
|
||||
home.file.".ssh/romantic.pub".source = "${mysecrets}/public/romantic.pub";
|
||||
|
||||
# One SSH key for GitHub and every host lives on the CanoKey as a resident
|
||||
# FIDO2 credential, exported on each desktop to ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk (ssh's
|
||||
# default identity); every use needs a touch. The per-host keys stay
|
||||
# authorized as the backup. Setup: docs/security-keys.md.
|
||||
# Each CanoKey holds a resident FIDO2 SSH key for GitHub and every host, its
|
||||
# handle exported on each desktop to ~/.ssh/canokey-<name>; every use needs a
|
||||
# touch, and ssh skips the handle of an unplugged key. Setup:
|
||||
# docs/security-keys.md.
|
||||
programs.ssh = {
|
||||
enable = true;
|
||||
# macOS's ssh has no FIDO provider ("Cannot download keys without provider").
|
||||
package = lib.mkIf pkgs.stdenv.hostPlatform.isDarwin pkgs.openssh;
|
||||
|
||||
enableDefaultConfig = false;
|
||||
# Keep this one definition: Nix merges a `settings."<pattern>"` attribute
|
||||
@@ -39,6 +41,11 @@ in
|
||||
# so the generated LAN patterns are merged inside it with `//` instead.
|
||||
settings = {
|
||||
"*" = {
|
||||
# Main key first, then the backup.
|
||||
IdentityFile = map (name: "${config.home.homeDirectory}/.ssh/${name}") [
|
||||
"canokey-tea"
|
||||
"canokey-moe"
|
||||
];
|
||||
ForwardAgent = false;
|
||||
AddKeysToAgent = "yes";
|
||||
Compression = true;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
|
||||
{ config, ... }:
|
||||
let
|
||||
hostName = "frieren";
|
||||
in
|
||||
{
|
||||
imports = [ ../../darwin ];
|
||||
|
||||
programs.ssh.settings."github.com".IdentityFile = "${config.home.homeDirectory}/.ssh/${hostName}";
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
|
||||
{ config, ... }:
|
||||
let
|
||||
hostName = "shoukei"; # Define your hostname.
|
||||
mkSymlink = config.lib.file.mkOutOfStoreSymlink;
|
||||
in
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -11,12 +10,6 @@ in
|
||||
|
||||
modules.desktop.vinput.enable = true;
|
||||
|
||||
# CanoKey key first (docs/security-keys.md), this host's key as backup.
|
||||
programs.ssh.settings."github.com".IdentityFile = [
|
||||
"${config.home.homeDirectory}/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk"
|
||||
"${config.home.homeDirectory}/.ssh/${hostName}"
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
modules.desktop.gaming.enable = false;
|
||||
modules.desktop.niri.enable = true;
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,12 +12,6 @@ in
|
||||
|
||||
modules.desktop.vinput.enable = true;
|
||||
|
||||
# CanoKey key first (docs/security-keys.md), this host's key as backup.
|
||||
programs.ssh.settings."github.com".IdentityFile = [
|
||||
"${config.home.homeDirectory}/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk"
|
||||
"${config.home.homeDirectory}/.ssh/idols-ai"
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
modules.desktop.gaming.enable = true;
|
||||
modules.desktop.niri.enable = true;
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,12 +1,9 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
pkgs,
|
||||
config,
|
||||
nixpkgsConfig,
|
||||
...
|
||||
}:
|
||||
{
|
||||
nixpkgs.config = nixpkgsConfig;
|
||||
|
||||
nix.settings = {
|
||||
# enable flakes globally
|
||||
experimental-features = [
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@
|
||||
{ lib, pkgs, ... }:
|
||||
{
|
||||
lib,
|
||||
pkgs,
|
||||
nixpkgsConfig,
|
||||
...
|
||||
}:
|
||||
{
|
||||
# Nix 2.35 is newer than nixpkgs' nixVersions.stable (still 2.34), so opt into
|
||||
# the latest released version until stable catches up.
|
||||
@@ -9,8 +14,9 @@
|
||||
# https://lix.systems/add-to-config/
|
||||
# nix.package = pkgs.lix;
|
||||
|
||||
# to install chrome, you need to enable unfree packages
|
||||
nixpkgs.config.allowUnfree = lib.mkDefault true;
|
||||
# NixOS only: darwin's nixpkgs.pkgs instance already carries it (lib/macosSystem.nix),
|
||||
# and nixpkgs rejects nixpkgs.config next to nixpkgs.pkgs.
|
||||
nixpkgs.config = nixpkgsConfig;
|
||||
|
||||
# do garbage collection weekly to keep disk usage low
|
||||
nix.gc = {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
lib,
|
||||
outputs,
|
||||
}:
|
||||
let
|
||||
hostsNames = builtins.attrNames outputs.darwinConfigurations;
|
||||
# nix-darwin passes an external instance through `nixpkgs.pkgs`, and nixpkgs
|
||||
# asserts that `nixpkgs.config` stays empty in that case.
|
||||
expected = lib.genAttrs hostsNames (_: true);
|
||||
in
|
||||
expected
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
lib,
|
||||
outputs,
|
||||
}:
|
||||
lib.genAttrs (builtins.attrNames outputs.darwinConfigurations) (
|
||||
name: outputs.darwinConfigurations.${name}.config.nixpkgs.config == { }
|
||||
)
|
||||
+12
-25
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
|
||||
{ lib }:
|
||||
let
|
||||
# CanoKey resident SSH keys: they log in like the main keys, and they are the
|
||||
# only keys pam_rssh accepts for sudo on servers through the forwarded agent
|
||||
# CanoKey resident SSH keys: the only user keys, and the only keys pam_rssh
|
||||
# accepts for sudo on servers through the forwarded agent
|
||||
# (modules/nixos/server/ssh-agent-sudo.nix).
|
||||
canokeySshKeys = [
|
||||
# CanoKey Canary (backup)
|
||||
"sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com AAAAGnNrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5QG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIKgfNy/wJgTw6auO4RmRHR9kh1Mt5TYNkomMDFLJ4Kw6AAAADHNzaDpyeWFuNHlpbg== ryan@canokey-moe"
|
||||
# canokey-tea (main)
|
||||
"sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com AAAAGnNrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5QG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAINuvSs4skjxNCTvN5k8rihUXOCst/XChw37aDeOmz+vvAAAAEHNzaDpyeWFuNHlpbi10ZWE= ryan@canokey-tea"
|
||||
# canokey-moe (backup)
|
||||
"sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com AAAAGnNrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5QG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIEZKUA4pNWvXKCpPQZHgctlR6O/71QirBQNt2RC5QsdfAAAAEHNzaDpyeWFuNHlpbi1tb2U= ryan@canokey-moe"
|
||||
];
|
||||
in
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -21,30 +23,15 @@ in
|
||||
# Purpose: system login password only
|
||||
# https://man.archlinux.org/man/crypt.5.en
|
||||
initialHashedPassword = "$y$jFT$RBapCH3F6bc0uSF.FaUGB.$rvhiVvcCKxkkumDFLONV5zFP1lsv1VyZ1ErH.r2rNk3";
|
||||
# Public Keys that can be used to login to all my PCs, Macbooks, and servers.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Since its authority is so large, we must strengthen its security:
|
||||
# 1. The corresponding private key must be:
|
||||
# 1. Generated locally on every trusted client via:
|
||||
# ```bash
|
||||
# # KDF: bcrypt with 256 rounds, takes 2s on Apple M2):
|
||||
# # Passphrase: digits + letters + symbols, 12+ chars
|
||||
# ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -a 256 -C "ryan@xxx" -f ~/.ssh/xxx
|
||||
# ```
|
||||
# 2. Never leave the device and never sent over the network.
|
||||
# 2. Or just use hardware security keys like Yubikey/CanoKey.
|
||||
mainSshAuthorizedKeys = [
|
||||
# The main ssh keys for daily usage
|
||||
"ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIIKlN+Q/GxvwxDX/OAjJHaNFEznEN4Tw4E4TwqQu/eD6 ryan@idols-ai"
|
||||
"ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIJwoI5MAogEa726jwwHL5EgM1X/i2A5d2pgV7i7t8fzB ryan@shoukei"
|
||||
"ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIDc1PNTXzzvd93E+e9LXvnEzqgUI5gMTEF/IitvzgmL+ ryan@frieren"
|
||||
]
|
||||
++ canokeySshKeys;
|
||||
# Public keys that log in to all my PCs, Macbooks, and servers.
|
||||
mainSshAuthorizedKeys = canokeySshKeys;
|
||||
# CanoKey U2F registrations for sudo (modules/nixos/desktop/canokey.nix).
|
||||
# Key handles and public keys only, so they are safe to commit.
|
||||
canokeyU2fKeys = [
|
||||
# CanoKey Canary (backup)
|
||||
"DwXDxVU+NDTUZs/d2EjpsPAh4mrg7dqdg/mAozkw/mUAAdEYDZIbm8kTBUGA49wXW0ZvSpF9VNYh2w84Xz9nAIAW////+Q==,6hqEjWBJ+ueBKBJaNijNkUsmlgEHMgv0KdpprqdJjHKoU/FKpeqo12SWlvdgiIVWvqTaGfe4fNu/ckcGY5mlsA==,es256,+presence"
|
||||
# canokey-tea (main)
|
||||
"1pS52FIPHfevn97Hiz5+OOFe0OaPBPqIrsD0r/mC/YIAAdEYDZIbm8kTBUGA49wXW0ZvSpF9VNYh2w84Xz9nAIAW////+Q==,LkVavaZRhu8nHhIj1r2N78BwOlU32Y/AAGkekzn5DLQCztnMs4uslIAvzzaNNCpaDu49xwZm4TqPBDKg0IuIlA==,es256,+presence"
|
||||
# canokey-moe (backup)
|
||||
"dxdeYeJTx40VhgPll05COx1Vn3WRKuXNgtHCTpTSyq0AAdEYDZIbm8kTBUGA49wXW0ZvSpF9VNYh2w84Xz9nAIAW////+Q==,cpBHKCdambMTGau3+eXVyv4JWQK7ZQ+8AbRt0EevCL0DeftDdXX6aatHSpbiXAhjip3R8pfeXi6GTW67YpdCPw==,es256,+presence"
|
||||
];
|
||||
secondaryAuthorizedKeys = [
|
||||
# the backup ssh keys for disaster recovery
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user