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Add three tests that verify control plane behavior for grant policies: - TestGrantViaSubnetFilterRules: verifies the router's PacketFilter contains destination rules for via-steered subnets. Without per-node filter compilation for via grants, these rules were missing and the router would drop forwarded traffic. - TestGrantViaExitNodeFilterRules: same verification for exit nodes with via grants steering autogroup:internet traffic. - TestGrantIPv6OnlyPrefixACL: verifies that address-based aliases (Prefix, Host) resolve to exactly the literal prefix and do not expand to include the matching node's other IP addresses. An IPv6-only host definition produces only IPv6 filter rules. Updates #2180
237 lines
6.4 KiB
Go
237 lines
6.4 KiB
Go
package servertest_test
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import (
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"net/netip"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/servertest"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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"tailscale.com/types/netmap"
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)
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// TestPolicyChanges verifies that ACL policy changes propagate
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// correctly to all connected nodes, affecting peer visibility
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// and packet filters.
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func TestPolicyChanges(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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t.Run("default_allow_all", func(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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// With no explicit policy (database mode), the default
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// is to allow all traffic. All nodes should see each other.
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h := servertest.NewHarness(t, 3)
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servertest.AssertMeshComplete(t, h.Clients())
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})
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t.Run("explicit_allow_all_policy", func(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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h := servertest.NewHarness(t, 2)
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// Record update counts before policy change.
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countBefore := h.Client(0).UpdateCount()
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// Set an allow-all policy explicitly.
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h.ChangePolicy(t, []byte(`{
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"acls": [
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{"action": "accept", "src": ["*"], "dst": ["*:*"]}
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]
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}`))
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// Both clients should receive an update after the policy change.
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h.Client(0).WaitForCondition(t, "update after policy",
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10*time.Second,
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func(nm *netmap.NetworkMap) bool {
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return h.Client(0).UpdateCount() > countBefore
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})
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})
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t.Run("policy_with_allow_all_has_packet_filter", func(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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srv := servertest.NewServer(t)
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user := srv.CreateUser(t, "pf-user")
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// Set a valid allow-all policy.
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changed, err := srv.State().SetPolicy([]byte(`{
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"acls": [
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{"action": "accept", "src": ["*"], "dst": ["*:*"]}
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]
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}`))
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require.NoError(t, err)
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if changed {
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changes, err := srv.State().ReloadPolicy()
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require.NoError(t, err)
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srv.App.Change(changes...)
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}
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c := servertest.NewClient(t, srv, "pf-node", servertest.WithUser(user))
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c.WaitForUpdate(t, 15*time.Second)
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nm := c.Netmap()
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require.NotNil(t, nm)
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// The netmap should have packet filter rules from the
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// allow-all policy.
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assert.NotNil(t, nm.PacketFilter,
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"PacketFilter should be populated with allow-all rules")
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})
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t.Run("policy_change_triggers_update_on_all_nodes", func(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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h := servertest.NewHarness(t, 3)
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counts := make([]int, len(h.Clients()))
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for i, c := range h.Clients() {
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counts[i] = c.UpdateCount()
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}
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// Change policy.
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h.ChangePolicy(t, []byte(`{
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"acls": [
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{"action": "accept", "src": ["*"], "dst": ["*:*"]}
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]
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}`))
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// All clients should receive at least one more update.
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for i, c := range h.Clients() {
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c.WaitForCondition(t, "update after policy change",
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10*time.Second,
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func(nm *netmap.NetworkMap) bool {
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return c.UpdateCount() > counts[i]
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})
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}
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})
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t.Run("multiple_policy_changes", func(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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h := servertest.NewHarness(t, 2)
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// Apply policy twice and verify updates arrive both times.
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for round := range 2 {
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countBefore := h.Client(0).UpdateCount()
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h.ChangePolicy(t, []byte(`{
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"acls": [
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{"action": "accept", "src": ["*"], "dst": ["*:*"]}
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]
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}`))
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h.Client(0).WaitForCondition(t, "update after policy change",
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10*time.Second,
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func(nm *netmap.NetworkMap) bool {
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return h.Client(0).UpdateCount() > countBefore
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})
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t.Logf("round %d: update received", round)
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}
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})
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t.Run("policy_with_multiple_users", func(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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srv := servertest.NewServer(t)
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user1 := srv.CreateUser(t, "multi-user1")
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user2 := srv.CreateUser(t, "multi-user2")
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user3 := srv.CreateUser(t, "multi-user3")
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c1 := servertest.NewClient(t, srv, "multi-node1", servertest.WithUser(user1))
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c2 := servertest.NewClient(t, srv, "multi-node2", servertest.WithUser(user2))
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c3 := servertest.NewClient(t, srv, "multi-node3", servertest.WithUser(user3))
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// With default allow-all, all should see each other.
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c1.WaitForPeers(t, 2, 15*time.Second)
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c2.WaitForPeers(t, 2, 15*time.Second)
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c3.WaitForPeers(t, 2, 15*time.Second)
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servertest.AssertMeshComplete(t,
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[]*servertest.TestClient{c1, c2, c3})
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})
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}
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// TestIPv6OnlyPrefixACL verifies that an ACL using only IPv6 prefixes
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// correctly generates filter rules for IPv6 traffic. Address-based aliases
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// (Prefix, Host) resolve to exactly the literal prefix and do NOT expand
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// to include the matching node's other IP addresses.
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//
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// PacketFilter rules are INBOUND: they tell the destination node what
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// traffic to accept. So the IPv6 destination rule appears in test2's
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// PacketFilter (the destination), not test1's (the source).
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func TestIPv6OnlyPrefixACL(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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srv := servertest.NewServer(t)
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user := srv.CreateUser(t, "ipv6-user")
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// Set a policy that only uses IPv6 prefixes.
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changed, err := srv.State().SetPolicy([]byte(`{
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"hosts": {
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"test1": "fd7a:115c:a1e0::1/128",
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"test2": "fd7a:115c:a1e0::2/128"
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},
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"acls": [{
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"action": "accept",
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"src": ["test1"],
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"dst": ["test2:*"]
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}]
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}`))
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require.NoError(t, err)
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if changed {
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changes, err := srv.State().ReloadPolicy()
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require.NoError(t, err)
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srv.App.Change(changes...)
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}
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c1 := servertest.NewClient(t, srv, "test1",
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servertest.WithUser(user))
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c2 := servertest.NewClient(t, srv, "test2",
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servertest.WithUser(user))
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c1.WaitForPeers(t, 1, 10*time.Second)
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c2.WaitForPeers(t, 1, 10*time.Second)
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// PacketFilter is an INBOUND filter: test2 (the destination) should
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// have the rule allowing traffic FROM test1's IPv6.
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nm2 := c2.Netmap()
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require.NotNil(t, nm2)
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require.NotNil(t, nm2.PacketFilter,
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"c2 PacketFilter should not be nil with IPv6-only policy")
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// Verify that IPv6 destination is present in the filter rules on test2.
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var foundIPv6Dst bool
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expectedDst := netip.MustParseAddr("fd7a:115c:a1e0::2")
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for _, m := range nm2.PacketFilter {
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for _, dst := range m.Dsts {
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if dst.Net.Addr() == expectedDst {
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foundIPv6Dst = true
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}
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}
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}
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assert.True(t, foundIPv6Dst,
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"test2 PacketFilter should contain IPv6 destination fd7a:115c:a1e0::2 from IPv6-only host definition")
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// With the current resolve behavior, the filter should NOT contain
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// the corresponding IPv4 address as a destination, because
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// address-based aliases resolve to exactly the literal prefix.
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var foundIPv4Dst bool
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ipv4Dst := netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.2")
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for _, m := range nm2.PacketFilter {
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for _, dst := range m.Dsts {
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if dst.Net.Addr() == ipv4Dst {
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foundIPv4Dst = true
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}
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}
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}
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assert.False(t, foundIPv4Dst,
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"test2 PacketFilter should NOT contain IPv4 destination 100.64.0.2 when policy only specifies IPv6 hosts")
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}
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