Files
headscale/hscontrol/servertest/policy_test.go
Kristoffer Dalby 0431039f2a servertest: add regression tests for via grant filter rules
Add three tests that verify control plane behavior for grant policies:

- TestGrantViaSubnetFilterRules: verifies the router's PacketFilter
  contains destination rules for via-steered subnets. Without per-node
  filter compilation for via grants, these rules were missing and the
  router would drop forwarded traffic.

- TestGrantViaExitNodeFilterRules: same verification for exit nodes
  with via grants steering autogroup:internet traffic.

- TestGrantIPv6OnlyPrefixACL: verifies that address-based aliases
  (Prefix, Host) resolve to exactly the literal prefix and do not
  expand to include the matching node's other IP addresses. An
  IPv6-only host definition produces only IPv6 filter rules.

Updates #2180
2026-04-01 14:10:42 +01:00

237 lines
6.4 KiB
Go

package servertest_test
import (
"net/netip"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/servertest"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"tailscale.com/types/netmap"
)
// TestPolicyChanges verifies that ACL policy changes propagate
// correctly to all connected nodes, affecting peer visibility
// and packet filters.
func TestPolicyChanges(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
t.Run("default_allow_all", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// With no explicit policy (database mode), the default
// is to allow all traffic. All nodes should see each other.
h := servertest.NewHarness(t, 3)
servertest.AssertMeshComplete(t, h.Clients())
})
t.Run("explicit_allow_all_policy", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h := servertest.NewHarness(t, 2)
// Record update counts before policy change.
countBefore := h.Client(0).UpdateCount()
// Set an allow-all policy explicitly.
h.ChangePolicy(t, []byte(`{
"acls": [
{"action": "accept", "src": ["*"], "dst": ["*:*"]}
]
}`))
// Both clients should receive an update after the policy change.
h.Client(0).WaitForCondition(t, "update after policy",
10*time.Second,
func(nm *netmap.NetworkMap) bool {
return h.Client(0).UpdateCount() > countBefore
})
})
t.Run("policy_with_allow_all_has_packet_filter", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
srv := servertest.NewServer(t)
user := srv.CreateUser(t, "pf-user")
// Set a valid allow-all policy.
changed, err := srv.State().SetPolicy([]byte(`{
"acls": [
{"action": "accept", "src": ["*"], "dst": ["*:*"]}
]
}`))
require.NoError(t, err)
if changed {
changes, err := srv.State().ReloadPolicy()
require.NoError(t, err)
srv.App.Change(changes...)
}
c := servertest.NewClient(t, srv, "pf-node", servertest.WithUser(user))
c.WaitForUpdate(t, 15*time.Second)
nm := c.Netmap()
require.NotNil(t, nm)
// The netmap should have packet filter rules from the
// allow-all policy.
assert.NotNil(t, nm.PacketFilter,
"PacketFilter should be populated with allow-all rules")
})
t.Run("policy_change_triggers_update_on_all_nodes", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h := servertest.NewHarness(t, 3)
counts := make([]int, len(h.Clients()))
for i, c := range h.Clients() {
counts[i] = c.UpdateCount()
}
// Change policy.
h.ChangePolicy(t, []byte(`{
"acls": [
{"action": "accept", "src": ["*"], "dst": ["*:*"]}
]
}`))
// All clients should receive at least one more update.
for i, c := range h.Clients() {
c.WaitForCondition(t, "update after policy change",
10*time.Second,
func(nm *netmap.NetworkMap) bool {
return c.UpdateCount() > counts[i]
})
}
})
t.Run("multiple_policy_changes", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h := servertest.NewHarness(t, 2)
// Apply policy twice and verify updates arrive both times.
for round := range 2 {
countBefore := h.Client(0).UpdateCount()
h.ChangePolicy(t, []byte(`{
"acls": [
{"action": "accept", "src": ["*"], "dst": ["*:*"]}
]
}`))
h.Client(0).WaitForCondition(t, "update after policy change",
10*time.Second,
func(nm *netmap.NetworkMap) bool {
return h.Client(0).UpdateCount() > countBefore
})
t.Logf("round %d: update received", round)
}
})
t.Run("policy_with_multiple_users", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
srv := servertest.NewServer(t)
user1 := srv.CreateUser(t, "multi-user1")
user2 := srv.CreateUser(t, "multi-user2")
user3 := srv.CreateUser(t, "multi-user3")
c1 := servertest.NewClient(t, srv, "multi-node1", servertest.WithUser(user1))
c2 := servertest.NewClient(t, srv, "multi-node2", servertest.WithUser(user2))
c3 := servertest.NewClient(t, srv, "multi-node3", servertest.WithUser(user3))
// With default allow-all, all should see each other.
c1.WaitForPeers(t, 2, 15*time.Second)
c2.WaitForPeers(t, 2, 15*time.Second)
c3.WaitForPeers(t, 2, 15*time.Second)
servertest.AssertMeshComplete(t,
[]*servertest.TestClient{c1, c2, c3})
})
}
// TestIPv6OnlyPrefixACL verifies that an ACL using only IPv6 prefixes
// correctly generates filter rules for IPv6 traffic. Address-based aliases
// (Prefix, Host) resolve to exactly the literal prefix and do NOT expand
// to include the matching node's other IP addresses.
//
// PacketFilter rules are INBOUND: they tell the destination node what
// traffic to accept. So the IPv6 destination rule appears in test2's
// PacketFilter (the destination), not test1's (the source).
func TestIPv6OnlyPrefixACL(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
srv := servertest.NewServer(t)
user := srv.CreateUser(t, "ipv6-user")
// Set a policy that only uses IPv6 prefixes.
changed, err := srv.State().SetPolicy([]byte(`{
"hosts": {
"test1": "fd7a:115c:a1e0::1/128",
"test2": "fd7a:115c:a1e0::2/128"
},
"acls": [{
"action": "accept",
"src": ["test1"],
"dst": ["test2:*"]
}]
}`))
require.NoError(t, err)
if changed {
changes, err := srv.State().ReloadPolicy()
require.NoError(t, err)
srv.App.Change(changes...)
}
c1 := servertest.NewClient(t, srv, "test1",
servertest.WithUser(user))
c2 := servertest.NewClient(t, srv, "test2",
servertest.WithUser(user))
c1.WaitForPeers(t, 1, 10*time.Second)
c2.WaitForPeers(t, 1, 10*time.Second)
// PacketFilter is an INBOUND filter: test2 (the destination) should
// have the rule allowing traffic FROM test1's IPv6.
nm2 := c2.Netmap()
require.NotNil(t, nm2)
require.NotNil(t, nm2.PacketFilter,
"c2 PacketFilter should not be nil with IPv6-only policy")
// Verify that IPv6 destination is present in the filter rules on test2.
var foundIPv6Dst bool
expectedDst := netip.MustParseAddr("fd7a:115c:a1e0::2")
for _, m := range nm2.PacketFilter {
for _, dst := range m.Dsts {
if dst.Net.Addr() == expectedDst {
foundIPv6Dst = true
}
}
}
assert.True(t, foundIPv6Dst,
"test2 PacketFilter should contain IPv6 destination fd7a:115c:a1e0::2 from IPv6-only host definition")
// With the current resolve behavior, the filter should NOT contain
// the corresponding IPv4 address as a destination, because
// address-based aliases resolve to exactly the literal prefix.
var foundIPv4Dst bool
ipv4Dst := netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.2")
for _, m := range nm2.PacketFilter {
for _, dst := range m.Dsts {
if dst.Net.Addr() == ipv4Dst {
foundIPv4Dst = true
}
}
}
assert.False(t, foundIPv4Dst,
"test2 PacketFilter should NOT contain IPv4 destination 100.64.0.2 when policy only specifies IPv6 hosts")
}