Commit Graph

6 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
yusing
41d0d28ca8 fix(api): confine file edits to rooted config paths and restrict unauthenticated local API binds
Finish the file API traversal fix by rooting both GET and SET operations at the
actual file-type directory instead of the process working directory. This blocks
`..` escapes from `config/` and `config/middlewares/` while preserving valid
in-root reads and writes.

Also harden the optional unauthenticated local API listener so it only starts on
loopback addresses (`localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, `::1`). This preserves same-host
automation while preventing accidental exposure on wildcard, LAN, bridge, or
public interfaces.

Add regression tests for blocked traversal on GET and SET, valid in-root writes,
and loopback-only local API address validation. Fix an unrelated config test
cleanup panic so the touched package verification can run cleanly.

Constraint: `GODOXY_LOCAL_API_ADDR` is documented for local automation and must remain usable without adding a new auth flow

Constraint: File API behavior must keep valid config/provider/middleware edits working while blocking path escapes

Rejected: Mirror the previous GET `OpenInRoot(".", ...)` approach in SET | still allows escapes from `config/` to sibling paths under the working directory

Rejected: Keep unauthenticated non-loopback local API binds and document the risk | preserves a high-severity pre-auth network exposure

Confidence: high

Scope-risk: moderate

Reversibility: clean

Directive: Treat `LOCAL_API_ADDR` as same-host only; if non-loopback unauthenticated access is ever needed, gate it behind a separately named explicit insecure opt-in

Tested: `go test -count=1 -ldflags='-checklinkname=0' ./internal/api/v1/file -run 'Test(Get|Set)_PathTraversalBlocked' -v`

Tested: `go test -count=1 -ldflags='-checklinkname=0' ./internal/config -run '^TestValidateLocalAPIAddr$|^TestRouteValidateInboundMTLSProfile$' -v`

Tested: `go test -count=1 -ldflags='-checklinkname=0' ./internal/api/... ./internal/config/...`

Not-tested: End-to-end runtime verification of fsnotify reload behavior after a valid in-root provider edit
2026-04-09 16:44:01 +08:00
yusing
a541d75bb5 fix(api/file): prevent path traversal in file API
Use os.OpenRoot to restrict file access to the application root,
preventing directory traversal attacks through the file download endpoint.

Also add test to verify path traversal attempts are blocked.
2026-03-19 10:50:58 +08:00
yusing
8756baf7fc fix(docs): remove application/json from /file/content API 2026-02-18 19:13:00 +08:00
yusing
6f75bb7593 refactor(api): replace apitypes module and fix swagger generation 2025-10-26 01:05:18 +08:00
yusing
f9affba9fc refactor(modules): replace github.com/yusing/go-proxy with github.com/yusing/godoxy 2025-09-22 16:44:59 +08:00
yusing
35a3e3fef6 refactor(api): restructured API for type safety, maintainability and docs generation
- These changes makes the API incombatible with previous versions
- Added new types for error handling, success responses, and health checks.
- Updated health check logic to utilize the new types for better clarity and structure.
- Refactored existing handlers to improve response consistency and error handling.
- Updated Makefile to include a new target for generating API types from Swagger.
- Updated "new agent" API to respond an encrypted cert pair
2025-08-16 13:04:05 +08:00