Commit Graph
4 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Herculino Trotta e2f26b3629 fix(sharing): enforce object-level authorization outside the rules app
The rules endpoints were one instance of a pattern repeated across every
SharedObject-backed app. Route the rest through the same helper.

DCA entries were the worst case and are strictly wider than the reported
rules bug: DCAEntry has an unscoped default manager, so filtering by
strategy__id alone reached entries on strategies the caller could not see
at all. No public or shared strategy was needed -- only a guessable
integer. strategy_entry_add/edit/delete now resolve through the parent
strategy with via="strategy".

Every SharedObject delete view carried an inverted condition:

    if obj.owner != request.user and request.user in obj.shared_with.all():
        obj.shared_with.remove(request.user)
    else:
        obj.delete()

An object its owner had made public matched neither branch's intent and
fell through to delete(), so any authenticated user could destroy it.
Confirmed reachable for accounts, account groups, categories, tags,
entities and DCA strategies. The owner now deletes, a shared user revokes
only their own access, and anyone else gets a 403.

The API viewsets had no object-level check at all. DjangoModelPermissions
gated them shut for ordinary users, who hold no model permissions, so this
was not reachable in a default install -- but the check belongs there
regardless, and a user granted change_account in the admin could write any
visible account. SharedObjectPermission adds it for the SharedObject
viewsets, leaving reads to SharedObjectManager.

account_toggle_untracked only flips the calling user's own row in the
untracked_by m2m, so it takes READ rather than EDIT.

Refs GHSA-83g9-vjqf-2j5q
2026-09-01 23:15:41 -03:00
Herculino Trotta 039ad225d3 test(rules): cover object-level authorization for transaction rules
Regression tests for GHSA-83g9-vjqf-2j5q, one per endpoint the advisory
named plus the delete and view paths found alongside them: a non-owner
gets 403 on every mutation of a public or shared rule, and the object is
asserted unchanged afterwards.

Also covers the parts that are easy to regress in the other direction:
shared users keep read access, a shared user deleting only revokes their
own access, unowned rules stay claimable, and children of invisible rules
answer 404 rather than 403.

SharedObjectPredicateParityTests asserts is_visible_to agrees with
SharedObjectManager across every owner/visibility/shared combination.
The manager builds a Q and the predicate tests an instance, so they
cannot share an implementation and can otherwise drift apart.
2026-09-01 21:43:13 -03:00
4273c541c5 Add API tokens and OAuth2 client support for external integrations
- Personal API tokens (model, user-settings UI, admin, management command,
  DRF auth class) for non-interactive API access from automations like n8n.
  Raw token shown once; only a SHA-256 hash is stored; last_used_at writes
  are throttled.
- OAuth2 authorization server via django-oauth-toolkit with authorization
  server metadata and optional, off-by-default Dynamic Client Registration
  (RFC 7591), so remote OAuth/MCP clients can authenticate and self-register.
- Tests for token auth, DCR gating and the management commands, plus
  .env.example and README documentation.

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-24 19:15:31 +04:00
Herculino Trotta 34a2b6bfd4 fix(procrastinate): close Django connections around jobs 2026-05-02 16:15:26 -03:00