2 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Herculino Trotta 4754f7e022 feat(api): serve a native MCP server at /mcp
Off unless MCP_ENABLED=true. Runs inside the web app (stateless Streamable
HTTP, JSON responses), so no extra container or supervisord program.

- Tools run the REST views in-process as the caller, so permissions,
  sharing, validation and transaction rules stay the API's.
- 11 curated tools with compact output, plus search_api/call_api to reach
  every other API endpoint from the OpenAPI schema.
- OAuth protected-resource metadata (RFC 9728) and a WWW-Authenticate hint
  on 401s, so MCP clients find the existing OAuth server and DCR.
- GET /api/transactions/summary/: totals per currency and type, optionally
  grouped by category, tag, entity, account or month.

API changes found while testing it:

- Writes no longer need Django model permissions, which nothing granted;
  access now matches the web UI (signed-in user, scoped querysets, owner-only
  edits of shared objects). API tokens and OAuth apps can now write for
  regular users.
- Account group owner is read-only; it could be set to another user.
- Reject negative installment, recurring, DCA and exchange-rate amounts, a
  zero recurrence interval, and performance on non-investment accounts.
- Accounts can be archived; group_id/exchange_currency_id are optional;
  category accepts null; currency prefix/suffix keep their spaces.
- Transactions filter by tags and entities.
- OpenAPI: separate request schemas (COMPONENT_SPLIT_REQUEST) and real
  descriptions for the viewsets and DCA chart actions.
2026-11-15 16:29:06 -03:00
Herculino Trotta e2f26b3629 fix(sharing): enforce object-level authorization outside the rules app
The rules endpoints were one instance of a pattern repeated across every
SharedObject-backed app. Route the rest through the same helper.

DCA entries were the worst case and are strictly wider than the reported
rules bug: DCAEntry has an unscoped default manager, so filtering by
strategy__id alone reached entries on strategies the caller could not see
at all. No public or shared strategy was needed -- only a guessable
integer. strategy_entry_add/edit/delete now resolve through the parent
strategy with via="strategy".

Every SharedObject delete view carried an inverted condition:

    if obj.owner != request.user and request.user in obj.shared_with.all():
        obj.shared_with.remove(request.user)
    else:
        obj.delete()

An object its owner had made public matched neither branch's intent and
fell through to delete(), so any authenticated user could destroy it.
Confirmed reachable for accounts, account groups, categories, tags,
entities and DCA strategies. The owner now deletes, a shared user revokes
only their own access, and anyone else gets a 403.

The API viewsets had no object-level check at all. DjangoModelPermissions
gated them shut for ordinary users, who hold no model permissions, so this
was not reachable in a default install -- but the check belongs there
regardless, and a user granted change_account in the admin could write any
visible account. SharedObjectPermission adds it for the SharedObject
viewsets, leaving reads to SharedObjectManager.

account_toggle_untracked only flips the calling user's own row in the
untracked_by m2m, so it takes READ rather than EDIT.

Refs GHSA-83g9-vjqf-2j5q
2026-09-01 23:15:41 -03:00